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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The capital markets are characterized by the asymmetric information existing between those traders 
having an advanced knowledge of the fundamental values, the so called informed traders, and those 
who are uninformed. Exploiting this superior information is not easy and requires a series of 
choices on the aggressiveness, the size and the type of order to place, in order to have the possibility 
of making profits from such privileged position. However, the informed trading then causes prices 
to change and to incorporate such information. This leads to the concept of market efficiency, 
which has pervaded the capital markets literature since the second half of the last century and, in 
particular, since Fama (1970)’s paper, which defines efficient a market where “prices always fully 
reflect available information”. 
Fama (1970) describes the efficient market theory in terms of fair game model and explains that 
the market can have different forms of efficiency (week, semi-strong and strong), depending on 
the level of information (historical prices, public information, and monopolistic information) 
reflected in the prices. In particular, in his review of the main tests conducted by the past literature, 
Fama provides large evidence sustaining both the weak form and the semi-strong form of market 
efficiency, whereas the strong form is defined as only a benchmark to detect the importance of 
deviations from market efficiency. Fama (1970)’s work, representing the cornerstone of the 
efficient market hypothesis, has been followed by a continuous debate, with researchers showing 
arguments clashing with the market efficiency and other providing answers to such criticisms and 
further developments.  
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) try to “redefine” the market efficiency, indicating how available 
information cannot be perfectly reflected in the prices, otherwise no one has incentive to acquire 
and analyse information, which is costly. This is only one of the arguments provided by the 
literature clashing with the market efficiency; indeed, other researchers focus also on the high 
prices variations, the overreaction and the underreaction to new information, the anomalies and the 
predictable patterns (e.g. “January effect” and “size effect”), the behavioural criticisms, the internet 
bubble and the global financial crisis.  
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Each of these criticisms has been followed by other studies providing different conclusions and 
sustaining the market efficiency. Among others, Malkiel (2003) underlines how markets are “far 
more efficient and far less predictable” than what is found by the critics. 
Many empirical studies have also tried to directly test the market efficiency, examining whether 
prices rapidly adjust to various types of information, such as corporate announcements or analysts’ 
reports; however, the results are quite variable, depending on the approach and the type of 
information that is used.  
This vast and controversial literature makes it difficult to understand whether markets can be really 
considered efficient or not. So, in order to contribute to such topic, considering the studies provided 
by the literature, we propose and implement an empirical approach to test the informational market 
efficiency. In particular, we focus on the company news alerts provided by Thomson Reuters Eikon 
for some randomly selected companies listed on NYSE and with a high market capitalization, 
trying to examine the impact of such instant news on prices, trading activity and profitability. 
In what follows, we proceed firstly considering the main literature on information and market 
efficiency and then providing our empirical research. More precisely, in the first chapter we focus 
on the role played by the information in the capital markets and, in particular, by the informed 
traders; in the second chapter we examine the concept of informational market efficiency, its 
development and all the debate characterizing the EMH; in the third and last chapter, considering 
the studies provided by the literature, we propose our empirical approach and discuss the main 
outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 13	
 
 
 
 
 
1.THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS: 
THE INFORMED TRADING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
 
The capital markets are pervaded by the presence of information asymmetry. In “Trading & 
Exchanges” Harris (2004) explains this situation as a condition in which “traders who know more 
about values and traders who know more about what other traders intend to do have a great 
advantage over those who do not”. Being all trades zero-sum games, the gains made by one side 
correspond to the losses of the other side; therefore, traders that have a high level of information 
make profits at the expense of those with a lower level of information. In the extensive literature 
dealing with information in the capital markets, we can essentially distinguish between two 
categories of traders: the informed and the uninformed. The first ones are speculators acting on 
fundamental information of the value of an asset that is not available to the others (Da Silva Rosa, 
Saverimittu and Walter, 2005), while the second ones are agents trading for liquidity purposes 
considering only public information and personal convictions (Martins and Paulo, 2014). The 
achievement of higher level of information is due to uncertainty on future payoff of a security 
coming from different dimensions, for example: the success of operations in traditional and new 
speculative lines of business of a firm, the technology that firms develop, the demand for products, 
the macroeconomic and industrial situation and the development of the firm (Goldstein and Yang, 
2014).  
The common classification of information is given by public, private or inside information. 
Informed traders refer to private information, that is the one that a trader obtains through analysis 
and investigation, or inside information, that is the one that only few specific individuals can obtain 
(management of a company, investment bankers, corporate officers etc.). Public information is 
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available to all traders and is the only information that uninformed traders can use for their trades 
(Hachmeister, 2007). 
Before starting with the analysis on informed traders and their impacts on the market, a general 
understanding about the most important points in the relationship existing between information and 
capital markets can be helpful. 
In “Information and Capital Markets” Stiglitz (1981) starts posing the two contrasting views 
present in the stock market about information. The first one refers to the fact that if prices reflected 
values, no one would acquire information and no informed market equilibrium can exist. Also, 
because insiders gain from outsiders, rational outsiders will decide not to trade. The second view 
is the one by Hirschleifer, for which in a pure exchange economy the incentives to obtain 
information are strong, because informed individuals can have a profit out of capital gain. In these 
two hypothesis we have that for one there may be no acquisition of information even in presence 
of social return, while for the other one there may be some investment in information even in 
absence of social return.   
Stiglitz (1981) argues that both positions are incorrect: the first one because does not identify the 
role in providing information of the seller of securities, the imperfect conveying of information 
from informed to uninformed and the possible presence of monopolies of particular individuals on 
some information; the second one because irrationality and/or non-competitive behaviour are 
implicitly assumed.  
According to Stiglitz (1981), in a competitive contest exists limited incentive for acquiring 
information of general value and in a limiting case of pure exchange economy the equilibrium is 
given by no information acquisition and no trade; however, in general cases with different 
individuals, incentives for obtaining new information are present, but if information is costly, it is 
imperfectly reflected in prices.  
However, in the stock markets trades do take place and the acquisition of information about 
particular instruments is considerable. Explanations are related to the fact that not all individuals 
are rational and the endowments of individuals are different so that, even with the same 
information, trade is desirable (Stiglitz, 1981). 
This general part introduces the following paragraphs entering more in detail in the analysis of the 
informed traders and their strategies, that will help us in the study of our topic: the role of 
information on affecting market efficiency. 
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1.2 INFORMED TRADING: INTRINSIC VALUE AND DIFFERENT TYPES OF TRADER 
 
As we said above, informed traders acquire and trade on information about fundamental values, 
called also intrinsic value (see Paragraph 1.2.1). More precisely, they estimate the fundamental 
values basing on private and public information and they decide to buy when instruments have 
prices significantly below the estimates and to sell when prices are significantly greater than the 
estimates they make (Harris, 2004).  
Informed traders gain if prices of their purchases rise and those of their sales fall, whereas they lose 
money if their estimates are not precise or, and this tends to be valid only in the short-term, if their 
estimates are accurate but prices move away from fundamental values (then in the long run prices 
tend to revert to fundamental values). 
The basic point is the estimation of the intrinsic value, so before trying to understand the different 
informed trader types and their characteristics, it is useful to describe and analyse more in detail 
what is the fundamental value. 
 
 
1.2.1 FUNDAMENTAL VALUE: THE TRUE VALUE OF AN INSTRUMENT 
 
The fundamental value measures the true value of an instrument. It is security value, justified by 
some factors such as earnings, dividends, assets and management quality (Scott, 2003). The 
intrinsic value is related to the expectation of the performance of an instrument (Ohanian, 1996) 
and is given by the expected present value of present and future benefits and costs relative to the 
instrument (Harris, 2004).  
The fundamental value is the central point of fundamental analysis, since it tries to find the value 
of an individual stock, which is then to be compared with the market value (Scott, 2003); the market 
value is the trading price of a security at which it could be purchased and sold (Harvey, 2012). The 
difference between intrinsic and market value is noise; if it is zero, prices are completely 
informative. 
A particular point of view about this difference is given by Black (1986), who considers to be 
informative those stock prices which are between one-half and twice their intrinsic value. 
The intrinsic value is driven by private, or internal, opinions and expectations (Wright, 2016) and 
because analysts have different views and information, the estimation of the fundamental value of 
a particular stock is often characterized by a great level of disparity (Scott, 2003). 
Informed traders use different ways to estimate fundamental values (see Paragraph 1.2.2), with 
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the same aim of finding the real value of the instruments and so trying to make a profit by buying 
or selling those instruments.  
Therefore, the next step is to describe and explain the different categories of informed traders with 
their different approaches in the estimation of the intrinsic value. 
 
 
1.2.2 INFORMED TRADERS: CLASSIFICATION, CHARACTERISTICS AND INTRINSIC VALUE 
IDENTIFICATION METHODS 
 
Informed traders (as also parasitic traders: order anticipators and bluffers) can be included under 
the category of speculators which are part of the wider group of profit-motivated traders. Informed 
traders, depending on their characteristics and on the way by which they identify the fundamental 
value, can be divided in four different categories: value traders, news traders, information-oriented 
technical traders and arbitrageurs. 
 
Value traders try to estimate the intrinsic value of an instrument by acquiring the highest possible 
level of information about economic activity, sales, costs, options of growth, technology 
development and management quality and applying on such information specific economic models 
(Harris, 2004). In this way they obtain a better knowledge of values than anyone else to buy/sell 
instrument they believe to be undervalued/overvalued.1 
The idea on which value trading is based is the one by Graham and Dodd. The main point is that 
value traders seek to buy stocks at lower level of the intrinsic value, which is computed discounting 
future cash flows. So when the price of a stock is lower than the intrinsic value by a margin of 
safety2 it is worth to buy (Harvey, 2016).  
A value trader clearly needs to be assisted by lots of experts with the aim of finding the best 
estimates. These experts include financial analysts, actuaries, statisticians, accountants, computer 
programmers, engineers, economists and so on. This makes clear the great effort required to make 
this type of trading work; only those traders who know how hard is value trading and stay put can 
earn superior returns (Harvey, 2016) 
Value traders in their estimations have to be really careful: if they are too much optimistic, they 
may purchase a security even in case of overvaluation; if they are too pessimistic they may sell 
																																																						
1 This allows them also to play the role of lender of last resort (Harris, 2004), supplying liquidity both directly and 
indirectly (by the intermediation of dealers) to uninformed traders. 
2 The margin of safety is usually given by the 30% of the fundamental value (Harvey, 2016). 
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even in presence of undervaluation. Therefore, as a solution, a pyramid-shape organization is 
adopted, in order to have more levels controlling the operate of the levels below (Harris, 2004).  
 
News Traders, differently from value traders, take their trading decisions according to market news 
announcements. They try to predict the short-term reactions of the market to a particular news. 
With their experience and historical data, news traders try to understand if an instrument will 
increase or decrease because of a particular future news. Essential for a news trader is to be quick 
to respond but also to be among the first to obtain the news. Since nowadays information remains 
new only for a fraction of second, engines based on algorithms filter text online assessing its 
importance in order to eventually execute the trade (Harvey, 2016).  
A particular contribution to the analysis of this type of trading is given by Foucault, Hombert and 
Rosu (2013) in “News Trading and Speed”. They start from the fact that information in news is 
not incorporated into prices immediately, that is there is the possibility to profit from news trading. 
This finds (non-exclusive) explanations in the fact that news traders could process information in 
a more efficient way and that they may react faster to news.  
The authors consider a model similar to Kyle (1985). In the baseline model the informed investor 
(the speculator) processes news more efficiently but has no speed advantage in receiving news with 
respect to dealers; in contrast, then they analyse also the case in which the speculator receives news 
faster than dealers. Foucault, Hombert and Rosu (2013) find that the optimal trading strategy in 
these two cases is different. With no speed advantage, the optimal trades of the speculator are 
determined by the difference between his and dealers’ estimate of the asset payoff3. Differently, in 
case of advanced access to news, the news affects his trading over and above its effect on the 
forecast error of the dealers, so the news becomes a distinct determinant of speculator’s strategy; 
also, with speed advantage, the optimal trading strategy is more sensitive and responsive to news. 
Therefore, this together with the other results provided by the model underlines how speed can 
play a crucial role in news trading (Foucault, Hombert and Rosu, 2013).  
A particular focus on the analysis of news traders is to be reserved to insider traders.   
Doffou (2003) defines insider trading as “the sale or purchase of securities by corporate insiders, 
using monopolistic information to their advantage to generate abnormal returns”. With 
monopolistic information he refers to non-public information which has the characteristics to be 
material, privileged and price sensitive. Therefore, insider trading indicates the use of this 
																																																						
3 That is dealers’ forecast error (Foucault, Hombert and Rosu, 2013). 
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privileged type of information by those who obtain it performing their professional duties (the 
insiders) or by those who receive it from insiders (Linciano, Macchiati, 2002). So, for example, 
insider trading on information related to mergers, stock splits or dividends increases is clearly 
profitable before the announcement of such events.  
For a better understanding of insider trading it could be useful to list some pros and cons. Leland 
(1992) identifies as positive aspect of insider trading the presence of new and useful information 
in the price; this reduces the risk for decision makers and, as consequence, will increase the asset 
prices and real investment. Among the cons Leland (1992) underlines: the “unfairness” of the 
market with the consequent lower investment of outsiders but also the lower level of asset prices 
and real investment; the reduction of market liquidity; the higher volatility of current stock prices. 
However, the plurality of studies and analyses characterizing this topic does not seem to have 
different impact on the policy adopted by different countries, which in general agree on prohibiting 
insider trading (Linciano, Macchiati, 2002). In particular, the data-set built by Bhattacharya and 
Daouk (2002) indicates how 87 on 103 countries having a stock market in 1998 have a regulatory 
on insider trading; among these 87 countries appear all the industrialized countries and the 80% of 
the developing ones (Linciano, Macchiati, 2002). 
The first to regulate insider trading were the US: in 1934 the U.S. Congress decided it was not good 
for financial markets and since that time it has been regulated in U.S. by the SEC (Doffou, 2003). 
One of the most important and famous case of illegal insider trading is the one of Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Company. The company between 1959 and 1963 found and confirmed the possibility of 
valuable deposits of silver, copper and zinc in an area of Ontario. As Hu and Noe (1997) explain, 
the company adopted controls not to leak the information to outsiders, while directors, employees 
and officers of the company bought shares and call options on the company or said other people to 
buy stocks or options on the company. After the announcement the price grew up, resulting in a 
large gain for those with that privileged information. Anyhow the SEC in 1965 filed a suit4 against 
them and won the case (Hu and Noe, 1997). 
 
Proceeding in our analysis, another type of informed trader is given by the category of information-
oriented technical traders. When we talk about technical traders5 we refer to traders taking their 
investment decisions using a technical analysis. A technical analysis has the aim to forecast the 
																																																						
4 The charges referred to the violation of Rule 10(b)-5 of the Security and Exchange Act of 1934. 
5 Definition extracted from the “Farlex Financial Dictionary”, Farlex Inc. (2012). 
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future securities prices from past market data, including price and volume (Guo and Xia, 2011). It 
is reputed the original form of investment analysis6 and many of its techniques used today to detect 
hidden relations in stock return have been used for over 60 years (Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron, 
1992). 
Technical analysis has been employed for long time by top traders, fund managers and experts, but 
academics have not agreed on whether it is really useful (Guo and Xia, 2011). It is seen as “voodoo 
finance” among some circles (Lo, Mamaysky and Wang, 2000) and Malkiel (1996) arrives to say 
that the chart-reading, typical of technical analysis, “must share a pedestal with alchemy”. 
Although some studies refer to technical analysis as useless, recent analyses consider these 
conclusions premature. Indeed, despite its jargon and methodology, it is a good way to discover 
information from the market prices (Lo, Mamaysky and Wang, 2000). An important direct support 
to technical analysis, among many others, can be found in Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992). 
Their conclusions refer to the fact that returns-generating process of stocks is more complex than 
proposed by studies with linear models and those hidden patterns could be captured by technical 
rules7: the results of their paper are consistent with the predictive power of technical rules.  
As we have seen, the forecasts made by technical traders are based on recurring price patterns; 
these price patterns can be caused by uniformed traders or by mistakes made by informed traders. 
In the first case technical traders act effectively as dealers or order anticipators, in the second case 
they become informed themselves and we have the so called information-oriented technical traders, 
who try to find patterns suggesting that prices are different from intrinsic value (Harris, 2004). 
Depending on the systematic mistakes of informed traders, successful trading opportunities 
decrease with maturity of the market and traders’ experience. Therefore, information-oriented 
technical trading is quite difficult and rarely considerably profitable.  
 
The last type of informed trader we analyse is the arbitrageur. Before trying to understand the 
mechanism of this informed trading, we start defining the arbitrage and in particular distinguishing 
among three different types: pure arbitrage, near arbitrage and speculative arbitrage.  
In the first case two assets have identical cash flows but different market value; the strategy is given 
by selling short the asset with the higher price, buying the cheaper one and holding on the 
differences without future risk exposure. This pure arbitrage is rare and in general may occur in 
																																																						
6 It dates back to the 1800s. The oldest technique is attributed to Charles Dow.	
7 The authors in the paper consider only two famous technical rules: moving averages and trading-range breaks. 
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derivatives markets8 and in fixed income markets9 (Damodaran, 2012).  
Different is the case of near arbitrage: here you have two very similar assets priced differently or 
assets that are identical and mispriced but without guarantee that the prices will converge; 
independently from the strategy adopted, the position you decide to take is no longer riskless 
(Damodaran, 2012). 
In the last case, speculative arbitrage10, investors see assets that are similar and mispriced and they 
try to take advantage by selling the more expensive asset and buying the cheaper one; if they are 
right they should get a profit (Damodaran, 2012). 
Our aim is not to enter in the detail of each type of arbitrage we have described, but to better 
understand the general features of this type of informed trader, the arbitrageur, which 
simultaneously buys and sells instruments that can be considered as similar. 
After arbitrageurs have identified inconsistently priced instruments relative to each other, sold the 
ones they consider the more expensive and bought the ones reputed cheaper, they will get a profit 
in the case that expensive instruments depreciate and cheaper ones appreciate or in the case that 
the expensive/cheaper instruments depreciate/appreciate faster than the cheaper/expensive ones 
(Harris, 2004). What is essential is a good estimation of the differences in value between the 
instruments11 but also the simultaneous buying and selling those similar instruments to have a 
protection against the changes of prices related to common factors. When we talk about “similar 
instruments” we refer to instruments whose value is related to common fundamental factors, that 
is industry, macroeconomic, physical, social or political variables (Harris, 2004).  
An important effect of the arbitrageurs’ trading is the enforcement of the so called “law of one 
price”. Indeed, the arbitrageurs try to take advantage from the differential, and the consequent 
buying and selling tend to eliminate the mispricing (Billingsley,2006). So in case of a correct 
identification of mispriced instruments, arbitrageurs help to make prices more informative.  
 
We have focused on the different level of information among traders and on the different informed 
trading approaches, but what about the way to use this advanced information and the possibility to 
realize superior returns with respect to the less informed traders? 
																																																						
8 Futures and options. 
9 Mainly in case of default-free government bonds. 
10 It should be clear that the speculative arbitrage for its characteristics is not really an arbitrage, but better a form of 
pseudo-arbitrage. 
11 Many are the possibilities used by the arbitrageurs for this estimation: statistical, economic or psychological 
methods.  
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1.3 HOW TO EXPLOIT THE INFORMATIONAL ADVANTAGE: SOME BASIC CHOICES  
 
1.3.1 INFORMED TRADING AGGRESSIVENESS AND SIZE. 
 
A basic decision for an informed trader, in order to use his privileged information in the best way, 
is to decide how to conduct his trades: aggressively or slowly. This decision, generally speaking, 
depends on whether the information is or will quickly become known by the other traders (and this 
implies to trade heavily) or whether it is possible to keep the informational advantage (and this 
implies to spread the trades) (Cao, 1995).  
In Kyle (1985), a single trader with long-lived private information optimally takes advantage from 
his monopolistic signals over time; more precisely, when trading in continuous time, his private 
information is leaked out at a constant rate. Differently, in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), 
when two or more traders have the same information, they trade aggressively in order to try to beat 
the other equally informed, with the consequent quick revelation of their advanced information 
(Back, Cao and Willard, 2000).  
A particularly interesting model is provided by Foster and Viswanathan (1994). They propose a 
dynamic trading model with two differently informed traders: one having all the private 
information and the other with only a subset of the information level of the first one. 
In this setting the better informed trader is concerned to understand in which way his strategy 
affects the information acquisition level of the lesser informed trader other than of the market maker 
and to adopt accordingly the most appropriate strategy to minimize the transfer of information.  
In order to reduce the transmission of its own advanced information to the lesser informed trader, 
the better informed is shown to trade very intensely in the first period on that information endowed 
by both traders but very little on its additional information. Than only in the later periods, once the 
common information has been dissipated through trading and the lesser informed has no more a 
learning advantage relative to the market maker, the trader with the better level of information 
starts trading on its informational advantage (Foster and Viswanathan, 1994). 
A different but absolutely relevant study related to the topic under analysis is the one by Barclay 
and Warner (1993). Most theoretical and empirical models about the behaviour of informed trading 
do not focus on the decision about the trade size; but re-examining the data used in many empirical 
studies (even if they are only related to the insider trading case), it can be seen how informed use 
essentially medium-size trades12. According to Barclay and Warner (1993), an informed, given 
																																																						
12 Between 500 and 9900 shares. 
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private signals on a security, has to decide the total share position and whether and in which way 
to break up trades13. The informed will decide the total share position taking into account some risk 
and portfolio considerations, whose impact may be difficult to be correctly quantified. Traders with 
valuable private information rarely will use small positions (with consequent small potential 
profit), while it is more likely to find individual traders that, because of their total wealth constraints 
and risk aversion, are limited to share positions of medium size or large traders taking large 
positions without being touch from such considerations. About the second decision relative to the 
breaking up, the choice of an informed to reach his share position in one or more trades depends 
on some specific factors. First of all, we have to consider the price concessions. These price 
concessions, whose components14 are higher in case of larger trade size, can have a small impact 
in case that trades are spread over time. But, on the other side, spreading trades delays the desired 
share position with the possible consequence that in the meanwhile the information could be 
revealed. It is also to be considered the impact of brokerage commissions with a fixed cost per 
trade, which reduce the cost of reaching the desired share position when using only one trade.  
Essentially it can be said that the share positions of medium size are likely to be acquired with a 
single trade because the reduction in price concessions arising from breaking up the trade is 
unlikely to offset the costs we have mentioned. Differently, in the case that the desired share 
position is large, the price concessions are substantial and there is a breaking up in more trades of 
medium size (Barclay and Warner, 1993). 
The hypothesis of the model (the stealth trading hypothesis) studied by Barclay and Warner (1993) 
refers to the fact that if trades of privately informed traders are concentrated in medium sizes and 
the movements of prices are essentially caused by their trades, most of the cumulative change in 
prices will occur on medium-size trades. The study, using a sample of NYSE tender-offer targets, 
finds results for the preannouncement period that support this stealth trading hypothesis. In 
particular, trades of a medium size are the cause of the estimated 92.8% of the cumulative change 
in prices in the period considered. These results are not consistent with different hypotheses.  
Barclay and Warner (1993) provide more generality to the results by investigating the sample 
securities also for a non-event period long before they experience a systematic unusual behaviour 
and also using a sample of all NYSE securities; in both cases the results are found to be consistent 
																																																						
13 The model considers only these two aspects of the stealth trading, ignoring aspects such as the use of limit/market 
orders or the use of options. 
14 The permanent one that reflects the information revealed by the trade and the temporary one reflecting the 
compensation for the intermediary providing liquidity. 
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with the stealth trading hypothesis.  
 
1.3.2 ADVANCED INFORMATION AND ORDER TYPE 
	 	
As explained by most of the literature, the central point in the decision between limit and market 
order is the trade-off between transaction costs and execution certainty (Cooney and Sias, 2004). 
But what are in detail the consequences for an informed trader deriving from choosing one or the 
other order type?  
Deciding to use a market order means that an informed trader can obtain immediate execution but 
has to bear those transaction costs related to the fact that in this case buy and sell orders are usually 
executed respectively at ask and bid price. Furthermore, the market order may indicate a higher 
probability of the presence of an informed trader because of the impatience revealed through this 
type of order choice; the risk is that this could be then followed by a consequent revision of the 
prices against the trader.   
Differently from market order, a buy/sell limit order generally is executed at the bid/ask price. The 
risk with limit orders refers to the possibility that information could enter in the price before the 
informed trader reaches the desired position. In any case, patient limit trades are liquidity providers 
and are seen as less probable to be informed, so they generally are not followed by an unfavourable 
revision of the quotes (Cooney and Sias, 2004). 
A fundamental study, in order to understand what type of order informed traders use, is proposed 
by Kaniel and Liu (2006). They show that, in case there is a high probability that information is 
long-lived, even after incorporating an order’s impact on the price, informed traders have a 
preference for limit orders. They also demonstrate that the probability of using limit orders can be 
so high that they transmit more information than market orders. 
Kaniel and Liu (2006) find that the longer the information horizon, the lower the execution risk of 
a limit order and consequently this increases the submission of this order type by informed traders. 
Another point touched by the study is about the level of the mispricing: if it is not so relevant, 
informed traders continue to prefer limit orders, but in case of a particularly high mispricing the 
cost of non execution increases, making informed traders more prone to market orders. The last 
point is about the quantity of uninformed, whose increase is demonstrated by the authors to increase 
the profitability of market orders more than that of limit orders, with the consequent preference of 
informed for the market orders (Kaniel and Liu, 2006). 
A different analysis is conducted by Cooney and Sias (2004), who consider a third option for 
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informed traders to execute an order: using a floor broker. By considering the trading crowd, the 
quoted depth, the limit order book and what learned in the relation with other traders, a floor broker 
can better evaluate the liquidity of the market than a trader who is off-floor (Cooney and Sias, 
2004). A floor broker is also able to reduce the impact of the order on the price by spreading his 
total order in smaller ones. 
Differently from the most models, which ignore the role of floor brokers, Cooney and Sias (2004) 
show that, despite the high commissions, floor brokers, rather than limit or market orders, because 
of their distinct advantages account for most informed trading. They also demonstrate that informed 
floor brokers are sometimes patient in their trading and, resulting from the analysis to be the most 
informed traders and highly responsible for values movements, it is shown, differently from most 
trading models, that changes in prices of securities depend not only on initiators but also on patient 
traders (Cooney and Sias, 2004). 
Therefore, the authors take distance from other studies referring to the same topic, introducing the 
figure of the floor broker, who results, beyond the other findings, to account for a higher volume 
of informed trading than limit or market orders, that are, as we have seen above, the only options 
generally considered by the other models. 
 
 
1.4 DO INFORMED TRADERS REALIZE SUPERIOR RETURNS? 
 
In the previous paragraphs we examined the asymmetric information between informed and 
uniformed, the intrinsic value, the various types and relative characteristics of informed traders and 
the basic decisions they take to exploit their superior information. But what about the performance 
deriving from being informed?  
As it can be inferred from the previous paragraphs, the profits of informed traders are related to 
their capacity in predicting future values and to the effects of their trades on prices (Harris, 2004).  
According to Figlewski (1982), whether an informed trader can have an expected profit depends 
on the relation between information he owns and that already inside the price. In particular, it is 
possible to say that an informed trader can profit if the information he obtains has not been already 
discounted by the market and can signal to him how the market will move (Figlewski, 1982).  
An interesting and complete model is developed by Da Silva Rosa, Saverimuttu and Walter (2005).  
In the literature it is commonly assumed that informed traders, considering they obtain advanced 
information from costly searches, can realize superior returns with respect to the uninformed; 
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nevertheless, before their model, there was no relevant study proving that informed are able to 
recover the costs of searching information through higher returns.  
Therefore, Da Silva Rosa, Saverimuttu and Walter (2005) try to confirm that this general 
assumption is true, demonstrating that informed traders are compensated for those costs related to 
the information search.  
Because of the lack of data, the other models studied only small groups of investors that are likely 
to have more information. Differently from these past studies, characterized by the difficulty to 
understand the level of information of specific traders and so their type (informed or uninformed), 
Da Silva Rosa, Saverimuttu and Walter (2005) use a panel giving for all firms that are listed on the 
ASX15 the daily share ownership records. In this way they can develop some measures to look at 
the abnormal changes in the share register across various dimensions and evaluate the presence of 
informed traders in the register. 
The results of the model indicate a positive and significant relationship between the abnormal share 
market performance and the level of informed trading. The study, and it is one of the first, gives 
evidence to the fact that informed traders can make higher returns and recover the cost for 
information acquisition16. However, beyond the other results, it is to underline that informed are 
found not to go in and out of the register before abnormal market performance, but as a response 
to such performance (Da Silva Rosa, Saverimuttu and Walter, 2005).  
 
 
																																																						
15 ASX stands for Australian Stock Exchange, which provided the data used in the model. 
16 Take into account that the findings are not consistent across all measures considered in the model.  
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Figure 1.1. The role of information in the capital markets: the informed trading. Summary chart. 
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2.THE INFORMATIONAL MARKET EFFICIENCY AND THE 
EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS DEBATE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
 
The informed trading with all its aspects and peculiarities has constituted the first step in the 
analysis we have been conducting. In the following paragraphs we will try to analyse in deep the 
concept and the main literature on the market efficiency.  
The efficiency we are considering is the so called informational market efficiency, that is the 
condition for which the relevant information is reflected in the prices (Dimson and Mussavian, 
2000). More precisely, the capital market efficiency indicates the degree at which the instrument 
prices accurately incorporate the current information that is present in the market place (Harvey, 
2012). 
Whether securities rapidly adjust in order to fully reflect such information has been the focus of 
the most important academic researches in the last decades; nevertheless, this question is one of 
the most controversial areas among investment studies (Reilly and Brown, 2011). The literature is 
characterized by a continuous debate on the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), starting in 
particular with the Nobel Prize Eugene Fama in 1970 and proceeding still nowadays with models 
sustaining or clashing with the EMH.  
Thus, in what follows our aim will be to analyse the impact of the informed trading on the security 
prices and, therefore, the concept of efficiency and its first developments prior to the study 
conducted by Fama (1970). Subsequently, we will pass through his work and the three different 
forms of market efficiency, weak, semi-strong and strong, in order to conclude with the last part 
centred on the most relevant studies and theories characterizing the EMH debate. 
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2.2 INFORMED TRADERS AND INFORMATIONAL MARKET EFFICIENCY 
 
2.2.1 THE INFORMED TRADING IMPACT ON SECURITY PRICES 
 
As reported above, the informational market efficiency is related to the information content of the 
security prices. Therefore, the first question to answer is how these prices can be informative.  
Harris (2004) explains that this can happen when traders have a good knowledge of intrinsic values, 
but generally these are not common knowledge, or when there is the presence of informed traders 
collecting and trading on all available information. This last case is exactly what commonly 
happens; in fact, informed traders cause prices to change and move accordingly to their 
information17.  
More in detail, as explained by Jones and Netter (2008), investment analysts search for stocks that 
are undervalued or overvalued, which constitute profit opportunities and make investors interested 
in trading. In this way, such trading causes the market to become efficient and stock prices to 
represent the present value of the future cash flows, that is the fundamental value. 
However, Jones and Netter (2008), recovering Fama (1991), underline how the level of market 
efficiency is related to low transaction costs, comprehending both costs of trading and information 
acquisition. Informed traders have to cover their expenses for obtaining and using such 
information, other than their other costs. But some information could be too expensive or it could 
be that it does not pay to buy and trade on certain type of information; the clear consequence is that 
prices do not incorporate all the available information, but only that information which traders can 
acquire and from which they can obtain a profit (Harris, 2004).  
 
 
2.2.2 THE INFORMATIONAL MARKET EFFICIENCY: THE CONCEPT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 
 
We have analysed the general meaning of the market efficiency and its dependence from the 
information reflected in the security prices by informed trading. But what is the precise meaning 
and development across time of such market efficiency?  
Many studies usually connect the first remote point of the long process conducting to the concept 
of the market efficiency with the “Liber de Ludo Aleae” by Girolamo Cardano (1564), who states 
as the fundamental principle of gambling the presence of equal conditions and describes the 
																																																						
17 See also Paragraphs 1.3.1 and 1.3.2. 
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decision to depart from it as foolishness or unjustness18 (Sewell, 2011). 
However, we do not consider all the subsequent steps along history, but we proceed directly with 
the one who is commonly considered the anticipator of the market efficiency concept, Louis 
Bachelier.  
Louis Bachelier (1900)19 in his “Theorie de la Speculation” explains that the market prices 
incorporate events of the past, present and future (discounted), but these events generally do not 
present apparent connection with price changes. Bachelier (1900) also shows that commodity 
prices are characterized by a random fluctuation (Dimson and Mussavian, 2000); this is then 
followed by Cowels (1933), indicating how forecasters of the stock market cannot forecast. 
Another work of particular relevance is the one by Williams (1938). He states that real worth and 
market price are to be distinguished and not confused; in particular, Williams was identified by 
Graham as the inventor of the process to determine the fundamental value of a stock (Lutolf-Carroll 
and Pirnes, 2009). Indeed, in his work Williams explains how the value of a stock is given by the 
discounted value of the sum of the dividends, that is the so called dividend discount valuation 
method (Price, 2010). 
However, before the 1950s there was not so much attention for stock returns and their economic 
meaning. Jones and Netter (2008) identify some main reasons: many saw stock markets little more 
than casinos according to Keynes’s view about the speculative nature of stock prices; during the 
Great Depression and soon after the World War II a lot of economists were in favour of investments 
directed by the Government; lastly, the necessity of large amount of capital is something related to 
modern corporations.  
The attention for the researches on such topic grew up only from the 1950s with the new 
possibilities given by the computing power (Jones and Netter, 2008).  
Even if there was evidence that stock price changes were random, there were some cases showing 
prices following predictable paths (Dimson and Mussavian, 2000). For instance, Cowels (1960) 
revisits and corrects an error in averaging made with Jones in a precedent work (1937), where they 
found significant evidence of correlation in averaged stock prices time series; but he comes up 
																																																						
18 It is foolishness if you depart from equal conditions in favour of your opponents, unjustness if it is in your favour 
(Cardano, 1564).  
19 Bachelier’s theory remained unknown until 1950s. As Samuelson explains in the preface of “Louis Bachelier’s 
Theory of Speculation” by Davis and Etheridge (2006), discovery (or rediscovery) of this theory dates back to the 
middle of the last century thanks to lots of postcards sent by Jimmie Savage, asking if anyone knew Bachelier and its 
work. Samuelson, apparently the only one to respond, found Bachelier’s original thesis and spread it to the early 
theorists (Davis and Etheridge, 2006).  
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again with results of mixed temporal dependence (Sewell, 2011). Working (1960) and Alexander 
(1961) explain that, using time-averaged prices, autocorrelation may be introduced into returns 
series. However, there seems to be a random fluctuation of returns, once series of returns are based 
on end-of-period prices (Dimson and Mussavian, 2000).  
For the purpose of our analysis the most relevant works started with Eugene Fama and Paul 
Samuelson. In “The Behaviour of Stock-Market Prices”, Fama (1965) begins with the old question 
about the meaningful of using past prices of common stocks to make predictions on future prices. 
As reported in his work, answers to such question are given by chartist theories20 and by the theory 
of random walks21. In particular, Fama (1965) concentrates the attention on the random walk 
model, supporting its validity and belittling chart reading. This study is of particular relevance also 
for the reason that for the first time Fama defines an efficient market; he writes: “A situation where 
successive price changes are independent is consistent with the existence of an efficient market for 
securities, that is, a market where, given the available information, actual prices at every point in 
time represent very good estimates of intrinsic values” (Fama, 1965).  
As indicated above, a central role is also played by Paul Samuelson. In particular, he provides a 
“Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly” (Samuelson, 1965) and 
concentrates on the martingale property (Read, 2012).  
However, all these models are the steps conducting to the main research on the topic under analysis. 
Indeed, Eugene Fama published in the 1970 his work from the title “Efficient Capital Markets: A 
Review of Theory and Empirical Work”.  
Now we do not enter more in detail on the contents of the paper, that will be the subject of the next 
paragraph, but we want only to conclude giving the precise definition of efficiency that Fama 
provides. In the introduction to his paper he writes: “A market in which prices always “fully 
reflect” available information is called efficient” (Fama, 1970). 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
20 They assume that the behaviour of past prices is full of information about the future behaviour (Fama, 1965). 
21 The theory states that the successive changes of prices are independent, identical distributed random variables; so 
the future behaviour is not predictable from the past (Fama, 1965).	
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2.3 THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS AND THE THREE FORMS OF EFFICIENCY 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that the prices of securities reflect in an accurate 
way the cash flows expected in the future and that those prices are based on all the information that 
are available to the investors (Petty et al., 2015).  
Apart from this formal definition, in order to better understand the idea of EMH, it is usually used 
the following fanciful illustration: two investors are walking, when one says that at the side of the 
road there is a $10 note; the other investor does not stop, answering that if it was really there, 
another person would have already pick it up (Price, 2010). 
The term “Efficient Market Hypothesis” and the distinction between weak and strong forms were 
first developed by Roberts in 1967 (Sewell, 2011). Then Eugene Fama in 1970 decided to review 
and organize the theory and the empirical works on the efficient markets; in particular, it is to 
underline that the early academic works before Fama were full of empirical analysis, but not of 
theory about such topic.  
Fama (1970) describes the theory of the efficient market in terms of a fair game model, arguing 
that all the available information is inside the market prices and so the expected returns are 
consistent with the risk (Reilly and Brown, 2011). He also distinguishes the EMH in three different 
hypotheses according to the type of information considered: the weak, the semi-strong and the 
strong form of EMH. 
As mentioned above, in this paragraph we will concentrate our attention to this essential work 
conducted by Fama (1970) from the title “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work”, and only subsequently we will pass to his and other developments constituting 
the continuous debate on the topic considered.  
 
 
2.3.1 EUGENE FAMA’S CONTRIBUTION: THE EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS REVIEW 
 
“The ideal is a market in which prices provide accurate signals for resource allocation: that is, a 
market in which firms can make production-investment decisions, and investors can choose among 
the securities that represent ownership of firms’ activities under the assumption that security prices 
at any time “fully reflect” all available information. A market in which prices always “fully reflect” 
available information is called efficient” (Fama, 1970).  
This extract from the first part of Fama’s work is the unavoidable starting point for the analysis of 
his study. In what follows we will proceed keeping the same order he uses in his review: firstly, 
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some theory and, subsequently, the empirical work. 
As discussed by Fama (1970), in order to have a testable model, it is essential to give a more exact 
meaning to the term “fully reflect”. Generally, the only base assumption of most of the works is 
that “the conditions of market equilibrium can (somehow) be stated in terms of expected returns”22. 
Conditional on a set of information, the security equilibrium expected return depends on the risk, 
which is differently defined depending on the theory considered. 
All the “expected return theories” are described by23: 𝔼	 𝑝	$,&'( 𝜙& = 1 + 𝔼 𝑟	$,&'( 𝜙& 𝑝$&             (2.1) 
The conditional expectation indicates that, whatever expected return model is used, in the 
determination of the equilibrium expected returns the information set 𝜙& is fully considered.  
It is also important to note that the tests based on the assumption about the use of expected returns 
to state the market equilibrium conditions depend not only on the market efficiency, but also on 
the validity of such assumption; however, this is necessary to have the possibility to conduct an 
empirical work on the market efficiency.  
The described situation, with the assumptions about the use of expected returns and about the 
formation of equilibrium expected returns based on 𝜙&, results in the impossibility of trading on 𝜙&with an excess of expected profits or returns with respect to the equilibrium expected profits or 
returns.  
If 𝑧$,&'( = 𝑟$,&'( − 𝔼 𝑟	$,&'( 𝜙&  then  𝔼 𝑧	$,&'(|𝜙& = 0 
Therefore, the sequence 𝑧$&  is said to be a “fair game” with respect to the sequence 𝜙& .24 
If it is considered a trading system as 	𝛼 𝜙& = 𝛼( 𝜙& , 𝛼3 𝜙& , … , 𝛼5 𝜙& , that is based on 𝜙& and 
gives the amount of funds at t to invest in each of the n securities, it generates in t+1 an excess 
market value 𝑉&'(.                               𝑉&'( = 𝛼$ 𝜙&5$7( 𝑟$,&'( − 𝔼 𝑟	$,&'( 𝜙&              (2.2) 
As above, according to the “fair game” property, it is possible to see that 𝔼 𝑉	$,&'(|𝜙& = 0. 
 
																																																						
22 This statement is always extracted from the work written by Fama (1970) that we are analysing.  
23 P and r indicate respectively the price and return of a security, indicated by j, at a certain time. 𝜙& stands for an 
assumed set of information fully reflected in p at t. The tildes in 𝑝	$,&'( and in 𝑟	$,&'( say that they are r.v. at t.  
24 Equivalently, the same can be done with the prices instead of the returns.	
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Fama (1970), after this part on the “fair game” or expected return model, proceeds his work 
focusing on two special cases: firstly, the submartingale model and then the random walk model.  
Assuming in (2.1) that for all t and 𝜙&  𝔼 𝑝	$,&'(|𝜙& ≥ 𝑝$&  or25 𝔼 𝑟	$,&'(|𝜙& ≥ 0 means that the 
sequence 𝑝$&  follows a submartingale with respect to the sequence 𝜙& . In the case that the 
expressions hold as equalities, the price sequence 𝑝$&  follows a martingale.  
An important consequence of a submartingale in prices is that “one security and cash” trading 
systems26 based only on 𝜙&	cannot obtain expected profits that are higher than a strategy given by 
always buying and holding during the future period considered.  
As mentioned above, Fama (1970) in the first part of his work focuses his attention also on some 
theory about the random walk model.  
Fama (1970) argues that the statement that “the current price fully reflects available information” 
was assumed, in the early works from the literature, to imply independent successive price changes 
and usually also identically distributed. Such combination forms the random walk model, that is27: 𝑓 𝑟$,&'(|𝜙& = 𝑓 𝑟$,&'( 													(2.3)	
However, this is more than what is said by (2.1). Indeed, the random walk model can be considered 
an extension28 of the general fair game model, which just makes the assumption about the use of 
expected returns to state market equilibrium conditions and says little about the process that 
generates returns. 
After the theoretical part, Fama (1970) concentrates on the empirical literature about adjustment of 
prices to the three types of relevant information subsets. Therefore, the empirical work is divided 
in the following three categories: weak form tests, in which the subset of information is only given 
by historical prices; semi-strong form tests, which refer to all information that is obviously publicly 
available; strong form tests, which concentrate on whether given investors or groups hold a 
monopolistic connection with any information that is relevant in the formation of the security price.            
All the empirical works on efficiency29 can be considered within the general “fair game” or 
																																																						
25 The two expressions are equivalent. 
26 We speak of systems concentrating on individual securities and giving the cases in which holding a security, selling 
short or holding cash. 
27 The expression indicates identical conditional and marginal probability distribution of an independent r.v.                        
Remember also that f is the same for all t. 
28 In the random walk model the statement about the economic environment is more detailed.   
29 Remember that the early literature refers in particular to the random walk model. As Fama (1970) underlines, most 
of the empirical evidence of the literature on the random walk model can be interpreted as tests of the more general 
fair game models. 
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expected return model and much of the evidence bears on the special submartingale model seen 
before. 
Now, without entering much in detail on the empirical studies, we will pass trough the main 
conclusions reached by Fama, considering the three categories in which the empirical work is 
divided.  
The tests about the weak form constitute the largest part in the literature. Fama (1970) finds fair to 
conclude that there is strong support to the EMH given by the results of these tests and, even if the 
evidence for dependence of successive price changes or returns is significant, part of it is consistent 
with the “fair game” model and the other part is not such to see the market as inefficient.  
Also the tests of the semi-strong form support the market efficiency. As reported by Fama, the 
work on “The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information” by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll 
(1969) explains that the information in stock splits about the firm’s payment of the dividends in 
the future is, on average, fully incorporated in the price at the time of the split. Other researchers 
come to similar conclusion considering firm’s annual earnings announcements and common 
stock’s new issues and large block secondary issues. 
The last category of tests refers to the strong form of efficient markets model, in which all available 
information are considered to be fully reflected in the prices. Therefore, this is essentially only a 
benchmark to evaluate the importance of deviations from the market efficiency. Only two are the 
groups that are seen by researches to hold monopolistic access to information: specialists on major 
security exchanges and corporate insiders.  
Fama (1970) concludes his work stating that, apart from the results discussed, not all questions are 
closed and still much remains to study; so much so that Fama himself will deal with works and 
reviews further developing this subject in response to the new researches following this 1970 paper 
(see Paragraph 2.4.2).  
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2.4 THE CONTINUOUS DEBATE ON THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
 
Many are the developments on the market efficiency that came after Fama’s work described above.        
All these studies present different analyses, which result in a continuous debate on the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis. Our aim is not to pass through all these developments, but to consider the main 
topics analysed by the literature, trying to explain which are the criticisms and the main arguments 
clashing with the EMH, but also which are the main developments sustaining it and the answers to 
the criticisms. 
 
2.4.1 ARGUMENTS AND ANOMALIES CLASHING WITH EMH 
 
Among the researches showing elements of distance from the EMH we can begin with the one by 
Grossman (1976), who provides a model explaining that diverse information is perfectly 
aggregated by “informationally efficient price systems”, but in this case there is no private 
incentive to obtain information; if the acquisition of information is costly and there is no noise in 
the price system, no one gains from collecting information and, therefore, no one collects it. Then 
in this situation there will be someone having the incentive to acquire costly information, but, when 
these individuals will become a lot, the price of equilibrium will aggregate their information and 
they will stop collecting it again.  
The most famous work on such topic is the one by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), which is clearly 
summarized by its title: “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets”. As they 
explain, the available information cannot be perfectly reflected in prices, otherwise no one has 
incentive to acquire and analyse information, which is costly. Therefore, a sensible model must 
leave some incentive for collecting information (Sewell, 2011). 
Proceeding with the main arguments that are opposed to the EMH, we have to consider the debate 
on the volatility of stock market. Shiller30, with his variance bounds tests, shows that aggregate 
stock market prices variations are too high to be explained by the subsequent changes in dividends 
payments (Marsh and Merton, 1986). Considering the assumption that, over time, expected real 
return on the market is essentially constant, Shiller arrives to state that the large stock prices 
variation, founded in his tests, determines evidence against the EMH. He also confirms this result 
in case that the expected real return on the market does not remain constant over time but changes 
(Marsh and Merton, 1986). However, many other studies, after Shiller’s work, provided results 
																																																						
30 In a series of papers between 1981 and 1982. 
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different from his conclusions. As reported by Lo (2007), apart from the questions related to the 
statistical inference, there may be many reasons for the variance bounds empirical violation; as 
indicated by the literature, it could be explained by violation of the efficient market hypothesis, or 
it could be a symptom of the smooth of dividends, or it could be referred to investors’ risk adversity. 
Lo (2007) also highlights that these results, provided by the literature, underline a particular aspect, 
namely, that tests of the efficient market hypothesis are tests of joint hypothesis; this means that 
any test on the statement that “prices fully reflect all available information”31 must refer to 
information content of the prices and the mechanism by which information is reflected in the prices. 
Apart from the high stock prices variations, some studies developed many other aspects that can 
indicate deviations from market efficiency. For instance, as reported by Lo (2007), some 
researches, concentrating their attention on the reaction of some investors to new information, show 
that sometimes they do not react in proper proportion and they overreact or underreact. 
However, proceeding in the field of arguments clashing with the EMH, most of the criticisms 
concern the anomalies and the predictable patterns studied by a vast literature from 1970s.  
We can start with the calendar effects and in particular with the “January effect”. Such effect 
indicates that the mean raw returns of securities in January is higher than in the other months of 
the year (Patel, 2016); more precisely, this effect is referred to small companies and involves the 
first two or three weeks of January. The January effect is clearly not consistent with the market 
efficiency theory; however, the growing literature sustains that it does not exist anymore in stock 
returns (Patel, 2016). Apart from this, many others are the effects referring to the seasonality that 
are discussed by the literature, for instance: the weak-of-the-month, the day-of-the-week and the 
hour-of-the-day effects (Dimson and Mussavian, 2000). 
Another type of predictable patterns is connected to valuation parameters; indeed, some researches 
claim that dividend yield of the stock market and price-earnings multiple have considerable 
predicting power (Malkiel, 2003). For example, for the dividend yield, it is showed that investors 
can earn a higher rate of return if they buy a market basket of equities with a relatively high initial 
dividend yield and a future low rate of return in case of a low initial dividend yield32.  
It is also possible to identify other predictable patterns which refer to the characteristics of the firms 
and the valuation parameters; in particular, it is necessary to consider the studies on the size effect, 
the value stocks and the equity risk premium puzzle (Malkiel, 2003).  
																																																						
31 From the statement used by Fama (1970) to define an efficient market. 
32 The study refers to an analysis conducted on the Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Index. 
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The size effect is well explained by Banz (1981), who analyses the monthly returns of shares listed 
on the NYSE from 1931 to 1975, finding that the fifty smallest stocks performed better than the 
fifty largest ones on a risk-adjusted basis (Dimson and Mussavian, 2000). However, as reported by 
Schwert (2003), this effect has been much smaller after it was discovered. 
Other studies concentrate their attention on the “value” stocks, showing that they have higher 
returns than “growth” stocks. In particular, many researches indicate that higher rates of return 
seem to be provided by stocks with low price-earnings multiples, that are called “value” stocks, 
rather than by those with low price-to-earnings ratios33 (Malkiel, 2003).  
As mentioned above, we have another type of regularity belonging to the class under analysis; we 
are talking about the so called equity risk premium puzzle. It is identified by Mehra and Prescott 
(1985), who show that the historical US equity premium is grater than it should be according to the 
standard neoclassical paradigm of financial economics (Mehra, 2008). 
The literature presents a lot of other predictable patterns; for example, Malkiel (2003), before 
giving its explanations on this subject (see Paragraph 2.4.2), in his review of the main regularities 
provided by the literature, recalls also the short-term momentum and the long-run return reversals. 
Indeed, some studies show that in the short-run (days or weeks) it is possible to identify some 
positive serial correlation of stock returns, while others identify a negative serial correlation for 
longer holding periods. 
In the 1990s, as reported by Shiller (2003), much of the attention of the academic research started 
focusing more on human psychology and its relation with financial markets. In this way it was 
developed the so called Behavioural Finance and its arguments against the market efficiency. 
Indeed, important criticisms to the EMH refer precisely to the human behaviour of the investors, 
which, because of loss aversion, overconfidence, overreaction, psychological accounting, 
miscalibration of probabilities, herding, regret and many other reasons, results to be often 
“irrational”, “predictable” and “financially ruinous” (Lo, 2007). 
We conclude this paragraph on the main criticisms and anomalies developed by the literature along 
years with a recent and particularly strong event indicated by many as the main argument against 
the EMH: the global financial crisis. Jeremy Grantham writes: “The incredibly inaccurate efficient 
market theory [caused] a lethally dangerous combination of asset bubbles, lax controls, pernicious 
																																																						
33 In addition, some studies claim that also the price-to-book-value ratio can constitute a good predictor of future 
returns. 
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incentives and wickedly complicated instruments [that] led to our current plight”34 (Siegel, 2009). 
Gantham is not the only one to see the EMH as the responsible of the financial crisis; similar 
conclusions are made by Justin Fox and many others. The main explanation they give for this 
charge refers to the fact that, believing that prices fully reflect all available information, regulators 
and investors did not verify what was the true value of publicly traded securities and so they did 
not identify an asset price bubble (Ball, 2009). However, as Siegel (2009) reports in an article of 
The Wall Street Journal, “Our crisis wasn’t due to blind faith in the efficient market hypothesis”. 
Similarly, Ball (2009) writes: “Despite the theory’s undoubted limitations, the claim that it is 
responsible for the current worldwide crisis seems wildly exaggerated”. 
The financial crisis is only the last example belonging to the group of the important events along 
history that provoked criticisms to the EMH. We remember, among others, also the Internet Bubble 
of the late 1990s, which is indicated by behavioralists as evidence of markets irrationality. 
However, as explained by Malkiel (2003), the stock market in that occasion may have temporarily 
failed as efficient allocator, but “bubble periods are the exception rather than the rule”. 
In this part we have focused on the main findings against the EMH that were developed after 
Fama’s work. But what are the main answers to the EMH criticisms and the further developments 
sustaining the efficiency? 
 
 
2.4.2 DEVELOPMENTS SUSTAINING THE EMH AND ANSWERS TO THE CRITICISMS 
 
The academic research focused on the market efficiency is completely divided: each of the 
criticisms seen above is followed, as already partially explained, by other studies providing 
different conclusions and sustaining such efficiency. This results in a continuous debate along years 
between supporters and critics of the EMH. 
The most relevant development and answer to part of the criticisms is given by Fama himself in 
“Efficient Capital Markets: II”. As first thing, Fama (1991), considering the work by Grossman 
and Stiglitz (1980), underlines that the extreme version35 of EMH is false (and it constitutes only a 
benchmark), because the costs of information and trading are positive and not zero. Apart from 
such costs, Fama (1991) indicates the joint-hypothesis problem as a more serious question for the 
inferences about efficiency, because the market efficiency can be only tested jointly with an asset-
																																																						
34 These words refer to Grantham’s quarterly letter of January 2009 and were then reported by Siegel (2009) in an 
article of The Wall Street Journal. 
35 Namely, that all information is fully reflected into prices. 
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pricing model. Nevertheless, he sustains that empirical work on market efficiency and asset-pricing 
models remains unequivocally interesting and really useful.  
As discussed in the Paragraph 2.3.1, the three categories in which Fama (1970) divides his 
previous work are the weak, semi-strong and strong form tests. Differently, here Fama (1991) 
changes such subdivision in: tests for return predictability, event studies and tests for private 
information.  
With this new distinction, the first category considers not only the forecast power of past returns, 
but also the works on returns forecasts through variables like dividend yields and interest rates, the 
cross-sectional predictability of returns36, the seasonal effects and the question on the high volatility 
of security prices.  
As explained by Fama (1991), the new results provided by the literature show that the security 
returns can be predicted from past returns, but also from dividend yields and many terms-structure 
variables. Fama (1991) points out that the new works refuse the good early “efficient constant 
expected returns model” and enter into the joint-hypothesis problem. Moreover, the apparent 
returns predictability could be spurious and, for example, represent the result of the chance 
conditions of the specific sample. We do not go more in detail, but in this review on studies 
included in the first category, what emerges is Fama’s explicit disagreement on the efficiency 
implication of these new studies on the predictability of returns; however, as he explains, they give 
the possibility to know better the returns behaviour.  
For what concerns the second and the third category, they change only in their title, but not in their 
coverage. Of particular relevance in this last part is that Fama (1991) indicates event studies, since 
they are really close to separating equilibrium pricing and market efficiency, as the most direct 
evidence (mostly supportive) on efficiency. 
Subsequently, in another work entitled “Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns and Behavioural 
Finance”, Fama (1998) tries to answer to some researches finding inefficiency about long-term 
returns, in particular, long-term underreaction and overreaction to information. The clear answer 
of Fama (1998) is that from these researches market efficiency cannot be rejected. Indeed, apparent 
overreaction is as frequent as underreaction and it is consistent with market efficiency. Moreover, 
as he indicates, two behavioural models, provided by some other researchers37 and accommodating 
overreaction and underreaction, explain well such anomalies; however, they show problems with 
																																																						
36Therefore, tests of the asset-pricing models and the anomalies are considered (Fama, 1991).  
37 He refers to the studies of Barberis et al. and Daniel et al. 
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other anomalies. Indeed, with long-term pre-event returns they both predict reversals for the post-
event, while reversals and continuations should be about equally frequent, an argument that is 
indicated by Fama (1998) as more consistent with market efficiency. We do not go deeper, but it 
is necessary to underline that all these long-term anomalies considered tend to vanish with the 
technique that is used, so that Fama (1998) indicates such apparent anomalies as “methodological 
illusions”.  
As we have previously explained, many others are the authors answering directly to the main 
criticisms and supporting EMH. In addition to Ball, Siegel and many others, who oppose to the 
main criticisms, we can also mention Roll (1994), who shows in practice that it is hard to make a 
profit from market inefficiencies (Sewell, 2011). 
However, among the main supporters it is necessary and unavoidable to include Burton G. 
Malkiel38, who in 2003 provides a review and an answer to the main arguments clashing with the 
efficiency in his work “The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics”.  
With respect to what is said by many critical researchers, Malkiel (2003) indicated the stock 
markets to be “far more efficient and far less predictable”. In particular, he writes: “The evidence 
is overwhelming that whatever anomalous behaviour of stock prices may exist, it does not create a 
portfolio trading opportunity that enables investors to earn extraordinary risk adjusted returns” 
(Malkiel, 2003). 
 
 
																																																						
38 He is also the author of the famous book, first published in 1973, entitled “A Random Walk Down Wall Street”, 
whose main concept is clearly summarized by the following words: “The market prices stocks so efficiently that a 
blindfolded chimpanzee throwing darts at the Wall Street Journal can select a portfolio that performs as well as those 
managed by the experts” (Malkiel, 2007). 
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Figure 2.1. The informational market efficiency and the EMH debate. Summary chart. 
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3.INFORMATION AND MARKET EFFICIENCY: AN ANALYSIS 
BASED ON INSTANT COMPANY NEWS 
 
 
 
 
 
	
3.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
 
The aim of this work is to understand what is the role of information on affecting market efficiency. 
However, trying to find a unique common answer on the informational efficiency of the markets is 
quite difficult given the vast and controversial literature on such topic.  
In particular, many are the studies that, with different results, have tried to examine whether prices 
rapidly adjust to new information. Among the first analyses, we find the work of Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen and Roll (1969), that we have already mentioned. They examine the process of adjustment 
of stock prices to information implicit in a stock split with results supporting a quick adjustment of 
prices and so the market efficiency. 
Along years many other analyses have tried to understand the effects of different types of news; 
they have focused, for example, on the impact of corporate announcements or analysts’ reports 
with the aim to identify the time required by prices to incorporate such information. Fama (2016), 
during a recent debate on the market efficiency, said: “there are all kinds of test with respect to the 
response of prices to specific kind of information, in which the hypothesis that prices adjust quickly 
to information looks very good; there are others where it looks less good. So, it’s a model, it’s not 
entirely always true, but it’s a good working model for most practical uses”.39 
Among the studies about the response to the arrival of new information, Busse and Green (2002) 
consider the Morning Call and the Midday Call segment on CNBC giving opinions of analysts and 
informing on developments affecting individual stocks and all the market. For the stocks that are 
																																																						
39 These words were pronounced by Fama (2016) during a debate with Richard H. Thaler for a Chicago Booth Review’s 
video entitled “Are Market Efficient?”. The full video is available at: http://review.chicagobooth.edu/economics/2016/ 
video/are-markets-efficient.  
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discussed by the CNBC call segments during the period considered, they examine the effects on 
prices and trading. Their results underline that stocks associated to positive reports show a 
significant price impact starting some seconds after the initial mention and lasting about one 
minute; in the case of stocks associated to negative reports, the effect is found to be longer, with 
prices adjusting for fifteen minutes. They find also that the trading intensity doubles in the minute 
following the news, with a significant increase of buyer/seller-initiated trades, and that there is 
evidence of small but significant profits for those trades executed within fifteen seconds after the 
first positive mention of the Midday Call. The authors conclude that, even if all available 
information is not instantaneously reflected in the prices, the market is efficient enough that making 
profits from largely disseminated information is not possible, apart in case of almost immediate 
trades.  
 
In this chapter we propose our approach in analysing the informational market efficiency and 
provide the relative results.  
Our model is based on collecting all relevant instant company news at the time of the first release, 
without waiting for any report happening at a given time or focusing on a certain type of news. In 
order to construct our sample of data, we consider companies listed on NYSE with a high level of 
market capitalization and the relative alerts from the company news section provided by Thomson 
Reuters Eikon, which represent the instant headlines of market-moving news released even before 
the publication of the entire stories. Using these news alerts, we analyse the impact of such 
information both on stock prices and trading with the aim to test whether the market can be 
considered efficient, and to what degree (weak, strong, semi-strong).  
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3.2 THE DATA SAMPLE AND THE METHODOLOGIES  
 
3.2.1 THE DATA SAMPLE 
 
We consider the stocks that are listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and we randomly 
select 25 companies from those in the first third for market capitalization. In Table 3.1, it is possible 
to find the list of the 25 companies, their sector (according to Thomson Reuters Business 
Classification) and their market capitalization. 
	
Table 3.1. The sample of the 25 companies. The table shows the randomly selected companies from those listed on 
NYSE and with a high market capitalization; all data in the table are extracted from Thomson Reuters Eikon. 
 
Symbol
JNJ
PG
VZ
LLY 74.704.176.724,10 
LOW 63.985.956.501,12 
GD 52.907.226.617,00 
SYK 43.709.749.042,14 
PX 34.982.982.516,78 
DE 31.615.224.505,45 
BHI 27.371.685.307,98 
SRE 25.168.636.932,45 
CAH 23.194.987.495,94 
UAL 23.142.810.424,02 
LB 20.646.013.308,60 
AMP 17.848.332.294,57 
NBL 17.527.536.911,48 
CAG 16.521.427.119,36 
FE 13.335.830.479,02 
DVA 12.594.120.000,00 
OKE 12.075.540.256,56 
COH 10.580.982.195,12 
KSU 9.113.021.918,47 
AJG 8.946.586.052,92 
PVH 7.928.159.314,80 
OGE 6.640.123.386,75 
Natural Gas Utilities (NEC)
Handbags & Luggage Retailers
Ground Freight & Logistics (NEC)
Insurance Brokers
Apparel & Accessories (NEC)
Electric Utilities (NEC)
Arthur J Gallagher & Co
PVH Corp
OGE Energy Corp
Apparel & Accessories Retailers (NEC)
Investment Manag. & Fund Operators (NEC)
Oil & Gas Exploration and Production (NEC)
Food Processing (NEC)
Electric Utilities (NEC)
Healthcare Facilities & Services (NEC)
Conagra Brands Inc
FirstEnergy Corp
DaVita Inc
ONEOK Inc
Coach Inc
Kansas City Southern
United Continental Holdings Inc Airlines (NEC)
L Brands Inc
Ameriprise Financial Inc
Noble Energy Inc
Sempra Energy Multiline Utilities
Cardinal Health Inc Drug Retailers (NEC)
Deere & Co Heavy Machinery & Vehicles (NEC)
Baker Hughes Inc Oil Related Services and Equipment (NEC)
Stryker Corp Medical Devices & Implants
Praxair Inc Commodity Chemicals (NEC)
Lowe's Companies Inc Home Improv. Prod. & Serv. Retailers (NEC)
General Dynamics Corp Aerospace & Defense (NEC)
Market Cap. ($)
312.833.943.402,72 
Eli Lilly and Co Pharmaceuticals (NEC)
Company
Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceuticals (NEC)
Sector
Procter & Gamble Personal Products (NEC) 225.773.489.249,88 
Verizon Communication Inc Integr.Telecommunications Services (NEC) 210.476.610.941,76 
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The period of analysis is the interval between 1st November 2016 and 13th December 2016; we 
extract, for each of the 25 companies, all the alerts from the company news section provided by 
Thomson Reuters Eikon40; such alerts represent the instant headlines of market-moving news even 
before the arrival of the full stories.  
For each news alert, we look at the time of its release. If it is included, for example, between 
14:33:01 and 14:34:00, 14:34:00 is called t=0, and we say that the news is released in the interval 
corresponding to t=0, which indicates the minute before (59’’). Therefore, in general, with “interval 
t” we refer to the minute between t-1 and t, whereas with “t” we refer to that exact point in time. 
It is also necessary to specify that we take into account only the news within the trading day; more 
precisely, we consider the news in the interval between twenty minutes after the opening of the 
trading day and twenty minutes before the closing of the trading day, in order to have the possibility 
to compute our analyses both before and after the release of the information. 
For each news, we extract, from t=-21 to t=20, the closing stock prices per minute from Thomson 
Reuters Eikon and we compute the returns and the cumulative returns. We also extract, from 
interval t=-2 to interval t=4, the traded volumes, the number of trades and the number and the 
relative prices of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated transactions. These extractions are made 
considering the values for each singular transaction occurring in each minute around the release of 
the instant company news. 
We then distinguish between positive and negative news. The approach we use to understand the 
impact of the information is based on the price change following its release. In particular, if the 
closing price at t=5 is higher with respect to t=0, we consider that the relative news has a positive 
impact; if the price is lower, a negative impact41. In this way, the 148 instant news alerts are 
distinguished in 81 positive and 67 negative. This distinction between positive and negative 
information will be maintained for all the subsequent analyses42.  
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
40 Thomson Reuters Eikon is a database providing all types of information, exclusive news, analytics and other data on 
the financial markets. 
41 If the price remains unchanged, we consider whether the return in interval t=5 is increasing or decreasing. 
42 Some descriptive statistics of the data are available in Table A, B, C and D reported in the Annex. 
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3.2.2 THE METHODOLOGIES 
 
In our model, for the types of tests that are implemented, we partially follow Busse and Green 
(2002), in order to examine the impact of the new information both on stock prices and trading. 
In relation to the stock prices reaction, we consider all the cross sectional returns43 both for positive 
and negative news. Then, in order to verify the time required by prices to adjust, we test, in each 
interval t, whether the average return is significantly different from zero. However, we are using 
intraday returns (our research is always conducted with data per minute), which cannot be 
considered to be normally distributed; so, we adopt the nonparametric bootstrap technique44, in 
order to conduct the t-tests and present the relative results.  
Always in relation to the stock prices reaction, we consider a similar approach also for the 
cumulative returns, in order to analyse the magnitude of the impact both before and after the release 
of the information.  
After this first part on the response of the stock prices to the news alerts, we concentrate our 
attention to examine the impacts of such news on the trading activity. 
Therefore, for each interval of time considered, we study the statistical differences both in the 
intensity of trading and in the order imbalances using a two-sample one-tailed Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, which allows to verify whether the values of a sample are stochastically 
smaller/larger than those corresponding to the sample of comparison45. In particular, these two 
directional hypotheses are tested using the following statistics (formulas 3.1 and 3.2): 
 𝐷' = 𝑚𝑎𝑥> 𝐹 𝑥 − 𝐺(𝑥)             (3.1) 𝐷C = 𝑚𝑖𝑛> 𝐹 𝑥 − 𝐺(𝑥)              (3.2) 
 
where F(x) and G(x) indicate the empirical distribution functions of the samples to be compared.  
In order to analyse the intensity of trading, we consider the volume and the number of trades per 
minute. Then, both for positive and negative news, we apply the two-sample one-tailed 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, in order to understand whether the volumes and the number of trades 
of a certain interval are larger than those of the period of comparison. 
																																																						
43 We define the return as the percentage change per minute between two successive closing stock prices. 
44 In implementing the bootstrap, we choose a high number of replications (equal to 1000), in order to obtain accurate 
results. This number of replications will remain the same each time we use the bootstrap technique. 
45 As period to which compare each interval of time, starting from the release of the information, we choose the two 
minutes before the news, that is the period constituted by interval t=-2 and t=-1. 
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A similar analysis is then conducted for the “order imbalances”, that we measure by calculating 
the following ratio:  
 
(number of buys – number of sells)/(number of buys + number of sells)            (3.3) 
 
In case of positive information, we apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to verify whether the 
values corresponding to each interval of time are larger than those of the period of comparison, 
whereas, in case of negative information, we test whether the values are smaller. 
As reported by the formula 3.3, in order to measure the order imbalances in each interval t 
surrounding the news announcement, we need to know the number of buyer and seller-initiated 
trades. Hence we exploit the tick rule and we consider the trades indicated by Thomson Reuters 
Eikon as occurring on an uptick or on a downtick46.  
In the last section of the analysis we try to understand whether there could be any possibility of 
making significant47 profits in case of trades occurring around the news release. In particular, being 
necessary to know the buy and sell prices, we consider the average price per minute of buyer and 
seller-initiated transactions in correspondence to each news alert, relying on the same trades 
classification used for the order imbalances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
46 Transactions occurring on a zero-uptick or on a zero down-downtick are also included. 
47 In order to apply the t-tests and verify whether average returns are significant, we consider the same bootstrap 
approach discussed before. 
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3.3 THE REACTION OF THE STOCK PRICES TO THE INSTANT COMPANY NEWS 
 
In this first part we try to understand the behaviour of the stock prices in the intervals surrounding 
the instant company news. More precisely, we try to identify the time that the prices require to 
adjust and the magnitude of the prices reaction. This will give us the possibility to understand if 
prices “fully reflect available information” and so make the first considerations on the 
informational market efficiency. 
 
3.3.1 THE TIME REQIRED BY THE STOCK PRICES TO INCORPORATE THE INSTANT NEWS 
 
In Paragraph 3.2.1 we described the process we adopt to construct our sample of data; in particular, 
for this first part of analysis we use, distinguishing between positive and negative news, all the 
returns in relation to the company news from interval t=-20 to interval t=2048.  
As we explained before, for each interval t, we implement the bootstrap approach to execute the t-
test and find the p-value, in order to understand whether the average return is significantly different 
from zero. The results are reported in Table 3.2, which distinguishes between positive and negative 
instant company news and provides the average return and the significance at ten, five and one 
percent level for each interval considered.  
In order to discuss the results obtained, we focus on the period around the release of the 
information, observing the prices reaction both before and after the announcement.  
For what concerns the positive news, the adjustment begins already in the first minute after the 
release; indeed, in correspondence to the interval t=1, the table shows positive average return and 
high significance. Other significant responses can be found some minuets later and, in particular, 
for the intervals t=4 and t=5. However, the effect does not stop and, as it can be seen in the table, 
the adjustment continues with significant impacts until t=15. Therefore, the prices start reflecting 
the positive instant news immediately after the release, but the whole process, lasting for fifteen 
minutes, seems to be quite slow.  
In relation to the periods before the announcement, apart in interval t=-6, there are no other 
significant price changes and so no other significant signals of traders’ forecasts and reactions to 
the upcoming positive news. 
																																																						
48	We remind that the returns are computed using the closing stock prices for each minute; this means that, for example, 
the return in interval t=0 refers to the return occurring between t=-1 and t=0.	
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Table 3.2. The time required by the stock prices to incorporate the instant news. The table provides the average returns 
and the significance from interval t=-20 until interval t=20. The significance at ten, five and one percent level is 
respectively indicated by *, ** and ***. 
Interval (t) Average Return Significance Average Return Significance
-20 0,0379% 0,0099%
-19 0,0182% 0,0095%
-18 -0,0032% 0,0151%
-17 0,0084% -0,0055%
-16 -0,0035% 0,0053%
-15 -0,0271% 0,0325% **
-14 0,0059% -0,0089%
-13 -0,0069% 0,0254% **
-12 -0,0122% 0,0211% **
-11 -0,0131% -0,0094%
-10 0,0256% -0,0026%
-9 -0,0024% -0,0079%
-8 -0,0493% -0,0080%
-7 -0,0211% 0,0146%
-6 0,0417% ** 0,0136%
-5 0,0049% 0,0316% **
-4 0,0160% -0,0110%
-3 0,0045% 0,0152%
-2 0,0275% 0,0166%
-1 -0,0061% 0,0146%
0 -0,0031% 0,0363% **
1 0,0441% *** -0,0382% **
2 0,0323% -0,0328% ***
3 0,0162% -0,0268% *
4 0,0561% *** -0,0417% ***
5 0,0450% ** -0,0143%
6 0,0282% * 0,0142%
7 -0,0227% * -0,0002%
8 -0,0267% 0,0066%
9 0,0077% -0,0080%
10 0,0220% -0,0065%
11 -0,0384% *** -0,0007%
12 -0,0069% 0,0158%
13 0,0187% ** 0,0041%
14 0,0030% 0,0097%
15 0,0279% *** 0,0177% *
16 0,0079% -0,0030%
17 0,0057% -0,0164%
18 -0,0041% -0,0092%
19 0,0118% -0,0055%
20 0,0077% 0,0024%
Positive Instant News Negative Instant News
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For what concerns the negative information, the table shows that the intervals after the news alerts 
until t=4 are characterized by negative and significant average returns, whereas in the following 
minutes, apart in interval t=15 (significant at ten percent level), there is no further significant prices 
reaction. Therefore, in four minutes the news effect seems to end and the information to be 
incorporated in the prices.  
Considering the period before the negative announcements, the table indicates some interesting 
results, with some positive and significant intervals; however, we will better discuss this point in 
the second part of the following paragraph, where, using the cumulative returns, the trend of the 
stock prices will be more clear. 
If we compare the effects of positive and negative news, in both cases the reaction of the stock 
prices is instantaneous, with the first significant response in the first minute; however, the 
adjustment to negative news seems to require less time than in case of positive news, with a faster 
process lasting eleven minutes less.  
 
 
3.3.2 THE MAGNITUDE OF THE STOCK PRICES REACTION 
 
After having considered the stock returns around the release of the instant news, we examine the 
cumulative returns, in order to understand what is the magnitude of the stock prices reaction. 
In correspondence to each time t, we consider the cumulative return, distinguishing always between 
positive and negative news. Using these data, we implement again the bootstrap technique for the 
t-tests, finding the p-values and so determining whether the cumulative average returns are 
significantly different from zero. The results are reported in Table 3.3, which provides, for each t, 
the cumulative average return, computed starting from the closing prices at t=-21, and the 
significance at ten, five and one percent level. 
For what concerns the positive instant company news, the cumulative average return starts 
increasing after the news release and from t=4 it is significantly different from zero.  
The results are really different for what concerns the negative news. The table shows significant 
cumulative average returns around t=0 and, in particular, it is to observe the presence of an 
interesting increase before the release of the negative new information and a rapidly decrease after 
its announcement.  
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Table 3.3. The magnitude of the stock prices reaction. The table shows the cumulative average return and the 
significance at each time t, starting from t=-21 until t=20. The significance at ten, five and one percent level is 
respectively indicated by *, ** and ***. 
Time (t) Cum. Average Return Significance Cum. Average Return Significance
-21 0,0000% 0,0000%
-20 0,0379% 0,0099%
-19 0,0563% 0,0195%
-18 0,0531% 0,0346%
-17 0,0615% 0,0290%
-16 0,0578% 0,0344%
-15 0,0303% 0,0671%
-14 0,0364% 0,0581%
-13 0,0294% 0,0836% *
-12 0,0172% 0,1048% **
-11 0,0040% 0,0954% *
-10 0,0298% 0,0928% *
-9 0,0275% 0,0850%
-8 -0,0210% 0,0770%
-7 -0,0417% 0,0915% *
-6 -0,0005% 0,1053% *
-5 0,0043% 0,1371% **
-4 0,0207% 0,1261% *
-3 0,0254% 0,1413% **
-2 0,0532% 0,1579% **
-1 0,0473% 0,1724% ***
0 0,0431% 0,2090% ***
1 0,0870% 0,1705% **
2 0,1190% 0,1375% **
3 0,1357% 0,1107%
4 0,1921% * 0,0689%
5 0,2370% ** 0,0544%
6 0,2649% ** 0,0688%
7 0,2423% ** 0,0686%
8 0,2154% ** 0,0751%
9 0,2229% ** 0,0669%
10 0,2448% ** 0,0603%
11 0,2057% ** 0,0596%
12 0,1985% ** 0,0756%
13 0,2172% ** 0,0797%
14 0,2205% ** 0,0894%
15 0,2485% ** 0,1070%
16 0,2566% ** 0,1040%
17 0,2624% ** 0,0874%
18 0,2582% ** 0,0782%
19 0,2701% ** 0,0727%
20 0,2778% *** 0,0750%
Positive Instant News Negative Instant News
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In order to provide a better explanation of the results, we plot the cumulative average return both 
for positive and negative instant news. 
We start with the positive information and, considering both the values reported in Table 3.3 and 
the trend shown in Figure 3.1, we try to understand the magnitude of the stock prices reaction.  
 
	
Figure 3.1. The positive news alerts and the trend of the cumulative average return. The chart represents the behaviour 
of the cumulative average return in correspondence to the positive instant news, starting from t=-21 until t=20. 
	
The chart shows essentially what we have also previously anticipated, that is a high response of 
prices starting from the release of the information. In particular, it can be seen how much prices 
increase, with a cumulative average return that goes from 0,04% in correspondence of t=0 to 0,26% 
in t=6. Then the prices stop their growth, but continue to adjust in the following minutes, with a 
trend characterized by successive downgrades and upgrades.  
For what concerns the significance of these results, reported in the previous table, it can be observed 
that from t=4 the cumulative average return remains significant, and, in particular, from t=5 it is 
significant at a five percent level (one percent level in t=20). 
If we consider the period preceding the release of the positive instant company news, we can see 
that the prices show successive small increases and decreases, with the cumulate average return 
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remaining on the range between -0,04% (in t=-7) and 0,06% (in t=-17). However, the tests indicate 
no significant results before the release of the new information.  
For what concerns the values in correspondence to the negative news, the trend followed by the 
cumulative average return is reported below in Figure 3.2. 
 
	
Figure 3.2. The negative news alerts and the trend of the cumulative average return. The chart represents the behaviour 
of the cumulative average return in correspondence to the negative instant news, starting from t=-21 until t=20. 
 
It can be observed that the chart is characterized by an increasing trend followed by a rapidly 
decrease after having reached its peak at t=0. Regarding the behaviour after the release of the 
negative instant news, it is consistent with the sentiment of such information; indeed, the 
cumulative average return goes from 0,21% in t=0 to 0,05% in t=5. Particularly interesting is that 
the values around the time of the release, and mainly before, are positive and significant. This is 
related to the fact that prices continue to increase before the announcements of the news even if the 
information that will be released is negative. Therefore, if the trend is consistent with the sentiment 
of the news after t=0, this is not valid for the period before. Such increase could be explained with 
the fact that traders lack forecasts on such upcoming news, which is completely reflected in the 
prices only after its release. 
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3.3.3 GENERAL REMARKS AND COMPARISONS 
 
The results of this first part of analysis indicate that the stock prices require some minutes to 
incorporate the information provided by the alerts of the market-moving news. In particular, the 
prices start reacting in the first minute after the arrival of the information, but the adjustment 
continues for the first four minutes in case of negative news, while fifteen minutes are required 
with positive news. We also find that the magnitude of the response reached in the first minutes 
after the release is particularly large and consistent with the sentiment of the news.  
Given these results, we can state that the stock prices do not “fully reflect available information” 
immediately after the release, even if the process of prices adjustment starts instantaneously.  
From a general point of view, our results can be considered in line with those given by the most 
part of the literature, which indicates that prices require within five to fifteen minutes to reflect new 
information; however, these studies follow very different approaches with many differences in their 
results. Among others, for the purpose of comparison, we can mention the works conducted by 
Patell and Wolfson (1984), Kim, Lin and Slovin (1997) and Busse and Green (2002).  
Patell and Wolfson (1984) focus on the effects on prices in case of earnings and dividends 
announcements and identify the first price changes in the first few minutes, with a full adjustment 
lasting from five to ten minutes.  
Completely different is the study of Kim, Lin and Slovin (1997), who analyse the impact of buy 
recommendations that are released to important clients before the opening of the market. They find 
that stocks incorporate the information within five to fifteen minutes after the opening of the trading 
day. They also consider the effects of public news; however, prices are found to remain unchanged. 
Busse and Green (2002) observe that positive news featured on the CNBC call segments is 
incorporated in prices within one minute, while negative news requires more time, about fifteen 
minutes.  
The results of these studies present some clear differences from those provided by our analysis; the 
main reason of such differences consists in the different approaches and sources of information 
that are used. In particular, we focus on the impact of the news alerts, which allow us to analyse, 
how prices react immediately after the arrival of all types of instant market-moving information, 
that is without concentrating on a release occurring at a certain time (Busse and Green, 2002) or 
on a particular type of news (Patell and Wolfson, 1984; Kim, Lin and Slovin, 1997). After this first 
part on the prices adjustment, we proceed our research trying to understand what are the effects of 
the instant news on the trading activity and on the possibility of making profits. 
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3.4 THE INSTANT COMPANY NEWS AND THE EFFECTS ON THE TRADING ACTIVITY 
 
We have analysed the significant price changes following the instant news alerts provided by 
Thomson Reuters Eikon; we consider it is also important to examine what is the impact of such 
information on the traders’ activity. In particular, in this paragraph we focus on the volumes, the 
number of trades and the order imbalances, trying to identify whether the news release causes 
significant increases both in the trading intensity and in the level of buyer/seller-initiated 
transactions.  
 
 
3.4.1 THE TRADING VOLUMES AND THE NUMBER OF TRADES  
 
As first step, in order to study whether there is an increase in the trading intensity in correspondence 
to the news release, we consider the trading volumes per minute both before and after the 
information and, more precisely, from interval t=-2 to interval t=4.  
We apply the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which allows to test the equality of 
distributions. In particular, we consider the one-tailed test, in order to understand whether the 
volumes in each interval are larger than those in the period constituted by interval t=-2 and t=-1, 
that is in the two minutes before the news release. 
We compute all the corresponding p-values and we report the significance at ten, five and one 
percent level in Table 3.4, which provides also the median trading volume for each interval 
considered, whose trend is then reported in Figure 3.3. 
 
	
Table 3.4. The trading volumes. The table provides the median trading volume for each interval t and the results of the 
two-sample one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The significance at ten, five and one percent level is respectively 
indicated by *, ** and ***. 
Interval (t) Median Sig. (K-S test) Median Sig. (K-S test)
-2 to -1 10023,5 10562,5
0 12028,0 12335,0
1 9546,0 12335,0
2 7358,0 13859,0 *
3 10962,0 13396,0
4 9858,0 13380,0
Positive Instant News Negative Instant News
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Figure 3.3. The trend followed by the median volume. The chart shows the behaviour of the median volume from 
interval t=-2 until interval t=4 in case of positive and negative news. 
 
The median volume tends to increase in the periods before t=0 both in case of positive and negative 
news alerts; however, using the two-sample one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the increase 
corresponding to the interval of the release is found to be not significant. 
For what concerns the period after the announcement of the new information, the behaviour of the 
median volumes is particularly different for the two groups of news.  
In case of negative news, the value remains equal to 12335 until t=1 and rises up to 13859 in 
interval t=2, which is found to be the only significant increase in relation to the intervals before the 
news. Completely different is the behaviour after the positive instant news, which is characterized 
by a decrease of the median volume until t=2, before recovering in interval t=3, but the test shows 
no significant growth with respect to the period of comparison.  
In general, as it can also be seen in Table 3.4, the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test show no 
significant upgrade of the trading volumes with respect to the two minutes before the release. 
Therefore, it is possible to state that such results indicate that the volumes traded after the news 
alerts are not particularly affected by the new information. 
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As second step, always in order to study the effects on the trading intensity, we consider the number 
of trades per minute both before and after the news alerts. Below (Table 3.5) we report the results 
of the test and the behaviour of the median number of trades.  
 
	
Table 3.5. The number of trades. The table provides the median number of trades for each interval t and the results of 
the two-sample one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The significance at ten, five and one percent level is respectively 
indicated by *, ** and ***. 
 
 
	
Figure 3.4. The trend followed by the median number of trades. The chart shows the behaviour of the median number 
of trades from interval t=-2 until interval t=4 in case of positive and negative news. 
 
Interval (t) Median Sig. (K-S test) Median Sig. (K-S test)
-2 to -1 83,5 89,0
0 104,0 118,0
1 96,0 102,0
2 74,0 115,0
3 96,0 107,0
4 99,0 107,0
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As it can be observed in Table 3.5 and in Figure 3.4, the median number of trades tends to grow 
up with respect to the period of comparison. The increase is particularly relevant in correspondence 
to the interval of the release t=0, where, with respect to the two minutes before the news, the median 
passes from 83,5 to 104 in case of positive information and from 89 to 118 in case of negative 
information. After t=0 the behaviour of the median number of trades decreases and then recovers, 
but the values remain always higher than in the minutes before the release, with the only exception 
in correspondence to the interval t=2 in case of positive news. However, as reported in Table 3.5, 
using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, this general upgrade of the number of trades is found to be 
not significant.  
Therefore, the results both for the volume and the number of trades seem to indicate that the two 
groups of news have some positive impact on the trading intensity, but the effect cannot be 
considered significant49.  
These tests on the volume and the number of trades examine whether there is an impact on the 
trading intensity, but without providing information on the direction of the submitted market 
orders. For instance, as reported by Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2002), the volume alone 
conceals important aspects of trading; indeed, there could be differences in the number of shares 
purchased and sold and analysing the changes of volumes does not provide such information. So, 
in order to examine whether the trades are placed in accordance to the information reported by the 
news alerts, we need to consider also the order imbalances in the minutes surrounding the news 
release.  
 
 
3.4.2 THE ORDER IMBALANCES 
 
An order imbalance can be defined as an excess of buy or sell orders and, as specified in Paragraph 
3.2.2, such imbalance can be measured dividing the difference between the number of buyer-
initiated and seller-initiated trades with their sum. The limit cases, given by 1 and -1, imply that all 
trades are respectively buyer-initiated and seller-initiated.  
Considering the order imbalances computed for the intervals of time around the news release, 
starting from interval t=-2 until t=4, we apply again the two-sample one-tailed Kolmogorov 
Smirnov test. In particular, in case of positive news, we test the hypothesis that the order imbalances 
																																																						
49	We also analysed the trading size and we obtained similar results. Indeed, no significant increase was found in case 
of positive information, whereas, in case of negative information, only one significant increase (at ten percent level) 
was found in correspondence to interval t=3.		
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in each interval of time are larger than those in correspondence to the period including interval     
t=-2 and t=-1; whereas, in case of negative news, we test whether the values in each interval of 
time are smaller than those constituting the group of comparison.  
For each interval considered, we report in Table 3.6 the results of the tests with a significance at 
ten, five and one percent level and the median order imbalance, whose trend can be observed in 
Figure 3.5. 
 
	
Table 3.6. The order imbalances. The table provides the median order imbalance for each interval t and the results of 
the two-sample one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The significance at ten, five and one percent level is respectively 
indicated by *, ** and ***. 
 
 
	
Figure 3.5. The trend followed by the median order imbalance. The chart provides the trend of the median order 
imbalance computed from interval t=-2 until t=4 for both types of news. 
Interval (t) Median Sig. (K-S test) Median Sig. (K-S test)
-2 to -1 -0,007576 0,013514
0 0,000000 0,076923
1 0,118483 *** -0,073892
2 0,060345 * 0,000000
3 0,028986 ** -0,025391
4 0,092127 ** -0,104167 ***
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Observing the behaviour of the median order imbalance, particular attention is to be reserved to 
the first minute following the news. Indeed, according to the sentiment of the information, the 
median order imbalance starts increasing in case of positive news, passing from 0 to 0,12, and 
decreasing in case of negative news, passing from 0,08 to -0,07. Then, the effects seem to diminish 
after t=1 and restart in interval t=4, where the median imbalances return to similar values as in the 
first minute after the release. 
However, looking at the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test in Table 3.6, we can see that the 
order imbalances are not always characterized by a significant increase/decrease with respect to 
the period of comparison. 
In case of positive news, significant shifts in the direction of the information are found for all the 
minutes after the announcement; in particular, the first minute shows a significant increase at one 
percent level, but also the third and fourth minute show high significance (at five percent level).  
Instead, considering the group of negative instant news, the results are quite different; indeed, the 
only significant decrease (at one percent level), with respect to the period of comparison, is found 
in correspondence to the interval t=4.  
These results imply that the news alerts are followed by significant changes in the order imbalances 
and such changes occur in accordance to the sentiment of the new information. However, the 
reaction seems to be faster in case of positive news announcements, which are followed by 
significant changes immediately after the release.  
Comparing these results with those for the trading intensity of the previous section, it is possible 
to conclude that the news alerts do not have particularly significant effects on the trading volume, 
the number of trades and the trading size, but they tend to significantly change the types of orders, 
increasing the number of buyer-initiated or seller-initiated transactions depending on the direction 
of the new information. This means that, after the release, traders tend to place orders which reflect 
the content of the alerts; but, is it profitable to trade on such information? 
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3.5 PROFITABILITY BY TRADING ON THE NEWS ALERTS 
 
In the previous paragraphs we examined how the stock prices and the behaviour of traders are 
affected by the instant information. However, we cannot refrain from assessing also whether there 
could be any possibility of making profits by trading in the period surrounding the news release.  
We now take into account only the positive news and we study whether purchasing in each minute 
between interval t=-2 and t=3 and selling in each minute from the first interval after the 
announcement until interval t=4 can lead to any profit. As buy price, we consider, in 
correspondence to each news, the average price per minute of the buyer-initiated transactions; 
whereas, as sell price, we consider the average price per minute of the seller-initiated transactions. 
Using these data, we compute the returns and the average returns for each buy and sell combination. 
Then, in order to test whether the average returns are significant, we implement the bootstrap 
technique and execute the t-tests, finding the relative p-values. Table 3.7 reports the results of the 
test and the average trading profits, whose behaviour is shown in Figure 3.6. 
 
	
Table 3.7. Instant news and profitability. The table provides the average profitability from interval t=1 until t=4, 
depending on the purchasing interval t. The significance at ten, five and one percent level is respectively marked by *, 
** and ***. 
 
 
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4
t=-2 0,0140% 0,0529% 0,0778%** 0,1052%***
t=-1 0,0043% 0,0441% 0,0680%** 0,0954%***
t=0 0,0051% 0,0448%** 0,0688%*** 0,0962%***
t=1 0,0260% 0,0500%** 0,0775%***
t=2 0,0124% 0,0399%*
t=3 0,0072%
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Figure 3.6. The trend followed by the average profitability. The chart provides the behaviour of the average 
profitability for each combination of purchasing and selling interval of time. 
 
The first relevant remark is the absence of negative profits for each of the combinations considered, 
even if not all the results of such combinations are found to be significant.  
If we consider as purchasing intervals the minutes before the release, the table shows quite large 
profits and high significance in case of choosing as selling intervals t=3 and t=4. However, for the 
purpose of our research, we are interested to understand whether there is any possibility of making 
profits by trading on the news alerts. Therefore, if we consider the case of purchasing in the same 
minute of the news release, significant trading profits (at five and one percent level) are found 
starting from the selling interval t=2. However, also purchasing in the two minutes after the news 
announcement is profitable and, in particular, high and significant average returns are found in case 
of buying in the first minute after the news release and selling in the third or in the fourth interval.  
If we compare our results with those of Busse and Green (2002), we note that they find the 
possibility to obtain a statistically significant return only in case of purchasing until fifteen seconds 
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after the announcement, that is much less than what we have found (two minutes). However, it is 
necessary to specify that they use a different approach both for the type of news and for the 
computation (for instance, they only analyse, as selling time, the first two minutes after the report 
with respect to our four minutes). Lastly, it is also to consider that, because of their high variability, 
we do not account for all the possible trading costs that can be involved in the computation, but 
they can play a role in decreasing the time of the profitable purchasing interval.  
Apart from the trading costs, our results indicate that trading on the news alerts can give some 
possibility of making significant profits. This confirms what we found in the first part of our 
analysis, where the time required by prices to incorporate the news alerts was the proof of a market 
that cannot be properly defined semi-strong efficient, in the sense that the prices do not fully reflect 
all available information as soon as it becomes public.  
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CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
 
The role of information and its impact on the market efficiency has been a controversial topic in 
the capital markets literature, with a continuous debate between supporters and critics of the EMH 
since Fama (1970)’s work.  
Many empirical researches, with various results, have provided different models in order to analyse 
the effects of the release of new information and, in particular, to examine the time required by 
prices to adjust to some types of news, such as earnings and dividends announcements, buy 
recommendations and analysts’ reports (Patell and Wolfson, 1984; Kim, Lin and Slovin, 1997; 
Busse and Green, 2002).  
Considering the models provided by the literature, in this work we proposed a different approach 
to examine the prices and trading response to new information and, in particular, we implemented 
an analysis per minute that allowed us to consider the reactions to all the news at the time of their 
first release. Therefore, in order to conduct our research, for some randomly selected companies 
listed on NYSE and with a high market capitalization, we focused on the news alerts within the 
trading day provided by Thomson Reuters Eikon, which represent the headlines of market-moving 
news even before the release of the full stories. 
As first step of our analysis, we focused on the behaviour of the stock prices in the minutes 
surrounding such news alerts and, in particular, we tried to identify the time required by the prices 
to adjust and the magnitude of the prices reaction.  
The evidence suggests that the process of the stock prices adjustment starts in the first minute after 
the news release, but lasts four minutes in case of negative news and fifteen minutes in case of 
positive news. We also showed that the magnitude of the prices response reached in the first 
minutes after the announcement is large and consistent with the sentiment of the new information. 
Therefore, for what concerns the prices reaction, it is possible to assert that, even if the adjustment 
starts instantaneously, prices do not fully incorporate new information as soon as it becomes public, 
but trough a gradual process.  
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Comparing these results with those found in other researches is not easy given the various 
approaches and sources of information that are used; however, even if with some differences, it is 
possible to state that our results are in line with those provided by the most part of the literature, 
which identifies the prices adjustment within five to fifteen minutes.  
After the analysis on the reaction of stock prices to the news alerts, we tried to understand whether 
such information has some effects also on the trading activity. In particular, we examined the 
trading intensity and the order imbalances, trying to detect the presence of significant changes.  
For what concerns the trading intensity, we considered the volume and the number of trades, 
verifying whether the values in each minute, starting from the news announcement, significantly 
increase with respect to the minutes before the news. However, both for the volume and the number 
of trades we did not find a significant increase.  
The trading intensity identifies the general reaction of traders to the news announcements, but it 
does not indicate whether there is any significant change in the number of shares purchased and 
sold. Therefore, this led us to focus on the order imbalances, and we obtained remarkable results. 
Indeed, the news alerts were found to be followed by significant changes in the order imbalances, 
with a significant increase in the number of buyer-initiated or seller-initiated transactions, 
depending on the direction of the news announcement. In particular, the reaction to the alerts seems 
to be faster in case of positive information, with a significant increase of the buy orders immediately 
after the news release.  
Given the results obtained, in the last part of the analysis we tried to identify whether there could 
be any possibility of making significant profits by trading on these news alerts. In order to answer 
to this question, we examined whether purchasing in the intervals surrounding the positive new 
information and selling in the following minutes could lead to significant profits.  
The evidence obtained suggests that not only those who are aware of the news before its 
announcement can obtain significant average returns, but, and this is the main result, also those 
trading on its announcement. More precisely, purchasing until the second minute after the news 
release can lead to significant profits, with particularly high and significant returns in case of 
buying in the minute of the release or in the first following minute and selling respectively from 
the second or the third minute. 
As a final point, in this empirical research we tested the informational market efficiency 
considering the effects on the stock prices, the trading activity and the profitability in the case of 
the arrival of the company news alerts. This type of information is instantaneously released and so 
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at the time of the announcement it is not obviously public and already interpreted by the market, 
as instead it could happen, for example, in case of analysts’ reports or buy recommendations.  
Therefore, recovering the classification provided by Fama (1970), we can conclude that the market 
seems to be not properly semi-strong efficient, since the news alerts are not reflected in the prices 
as soon as they become public, but through a gradual process, leading to the possibility of making 
significant profits by trading on such news in the first minutes after the release. 
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ANNEX 
	
	
Table A. Summary statistics of the closing stock prices for the 81 positive and 67 negative news alerts. 
Time (t) Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
-21 72,5713 28,8261 33,7550 177,9634 81,4252 35,8044 30,4400 176,1800
-20 72,5903 28,8277 33,7000 177,9900 81,4359 35,8188 30,4750 176,1400
-19 72,5919 28,8163 33,7200 178,1900 81,4425 35,8224 30,4771 176,2450
-18 72,5879 28,8083 33,7200 178,1200 81,4479 35,7939 30,4536 176,2450
-17 72,5963 28,8184 33,7342 178,1400 81,4361 35,7652 30,4601 176,0500
-16 72,5947 28,8153 33,7500 178,0500 81,4385 35,7585 30,4500 176,2100
-15 72,5800 28,8264 33,7700 178,0800 81,4672 35,7845 30,4450 176,2100
-14 72,5858 28,8335 33,8200 178,0200 81,4631 35,7922 30,4500 176,3500
-13 72,5851 28,8475 33,8000 178,0400 81,4807 35,7903 30,4450 176,6100
-12 72,5791 28,8524 33,7850 178,0300 81,5019 35,8200 30,4500 176,7000
-11 72,5698 28,8481 33,8000 178,0600 81,4916 35,8091 30,4500 176,7000
-10 72,5975 28,8925 33,8300 178,0700 81,4835 35,7873 30,4500 176,5600
-9 72,5912 28,8847 33,8000 178,1100 81,4771 35,7877 30,4400 176,5500
-8 72,5717 28,9215 33,7914 178,0800 81,4736 35,7950 30,4400 176,6250
-7 72,5496 28,8958 33,8100 178,0400 81,4843 35,7960 30,4375 176,8100
-6 72,5712 28,8817 33,7850 178,0300 81,4944 35,7976 30,4355 176,8100
-5 72,5750 28,8849 33,7950 178,0160 81,5138 35,7827 30,4100 176,6500
-4 72,5904 28,9001 33,7950 178,0300 81,5068 35,7839 30,3900 176,5050
-3 72,5805 28,8745 33,8000 178,1400 81,5202 35,7877 30,4000 176,3200
-2 72,5998 28,8784 33,7600 178,1300 81,5372 35,8010 30,3800 176,2450
-1 72,5978 28,8800 33,6950 178,0900 81,5471 35,7968 30,3850 176,2450
0 72,5955 28,8719 33,6500 178,1100 81,5711 35,7853 30,3850 176,2300
1 72,6276 28,8804 33,6400 178,1600 81,5460 35,7919 30,4050 176,1450
2 72,6490 28,8800 33,6600 178,1800 81,5153 35,7727 30,4100 176,2100
3 72,6586 28,8840 33,6600 178,2200 81,4862 35,7448 30,3900 176,2100
4 72,6924 28,8850 33,6967 178,2200 81,4548 35,7386 30,3650 176,0839
5 72,7218 28,8881 33,6950 178,1500 81,4507 35,7502 30,3540 176,0150
6 72,7447 28,8986 33,7100 178,1900 81,4561 35,7335 30,3600 176,0700
7 72,7332 28,9051 33,7000 178,2000 81,4631 35,7581 30,3500 176,2300
8 72,7176 28,9177 33,7000 178,2400 81,4700 35,7669 30,3600 176,2350
9 72,7225 28,9160 33,7050 178,2200 81,4652 35,7740 30,3800 176,3000
10 72,7418 28,9263 33,7150 178,2000 81,4624 35,7889 30,4000 176,3800
11 72,7203 28,9355 33,6950 178,3000 81,4573 35,7810 30,4200 176,3800
12 72,7132 28,9287 33,6900 178,3400 81,4635 35,7666 30,4200 176,3800
13 72,7224 28,9261 33,6950 178,3600 81,4693 35,7753 30,4350 176,4990
14 72,7244 28,9309 33,6950 178,4200 81,4726 35,7711 30,4400 176,5200
15 72,7391 28,9240 33,6950 178,3700 81,4839 35,7691 30,4500 176,5400
16 72,7436 28,9239 33,6900 178,4100 81,4822 35,7693 30,4200 176,5400
17 72,7505 28,9301 33,6850 178,3250 81,4648 35,7470 30,3850 176,4400
18 72,7446 28,9194 33,7000 178,3600 81,4555 35,7388 30,3900 176,4300
19 72,7547 28,9289 33,7300 178,3900 81,4529 35,7412 30,3675 176,4000
20 72,7588 28,9241 33,7000 178,3800 81,4525 35,7394 30,3650 176,4500
Positive Instant News Negative Instant News
	70	
 
 
 
 
 
	
Table B. Summary statistics of the volume and the number of trades for the 81 positive and 67 negative news alerts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interval(t) Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Volume
-2 30090,88 56744,24 142 318086 23382,64 38388,36 531 192469
-1 26849,64 49850,07 505 356777 19053,52 26474,66 11 177578
0 25650,43 43683,35 105 290206 26258,69 52253,43 371 345292
1 27736,02 47819,36 122 283603 22139,30 48688,15 1406 390894
2 22183,28 47516,61 145 356777 23831,97 38841,35 405 253621
3 24377,01 42298,20 155 290206 23974,39 51246,80 21 346541
4 20065,42 28504,07 490 166195 24109,15 42840,00 215 250878
-2 189,77 302,59 5 1764 155,09 221,28 7 1524
-1 169,94 262,67 9 1913 133,55 125,23 1 681
0 165,68 215,03 2 1459 175,84 264,70 7 1712
1 149,62 172,69 3 866 145,46 199,24 16 1549
2 138,15 249,18 3 1913 159,52 207,67 6 1435
3 151,77 208,56 4 1459 162,06 303,22 2 2242
4 144,80 172,90 5 985 164,06 249,42 3 1645
Positive Instant News Negative Instant News
Number of trades
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Table C. Summary statistics of the number of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades for the 81 positive and 67 
negative news alerts. 
 
 
 
 
 
Interval(t) Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Number of byuer-initiated trades
-2 74,94 129,54 0 668 53,94 71,39 1 341
-1 70,62 135,45 0 1058 53,04 59,72 0 313
0 66,07 97,56 0 644 74,93 127,64 1 725
1 64,53 88,65 0 510 50,73 84,35 0 657
2 59,99 136,47 1 1058 57,40 79,20 0 540
3 62,79 95,75 0 644 61,07 114,69 0 811
4 55,68 63,80 0 326 54,97 103,88 0 698
Number of seller-initiated trades
-2 77,33 136,51 0 908 52,18 66,06 0 328
-1 66,32 101,84 0 647 45,33 45,60 0 209
0 63,51 97,75 0 679 57,96 86,36 0 574
1 52,91 67,85 0 329 56,25 75,29 2 551
2 49,37 90,64 0 647 60,85 91,09 0 605
3 57,59 91,57 0 679 64,58 142,30 0 1070
4 49,12 64,85 0 335 65,09 103,83 0 674
Positive Instant News Negative Instant News
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Table D. Summary statistics of the prices of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades for the 81 positive and 67 
negative news alerts.	
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interval(t) Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
-2 72,5833 28,8822 33,7961 178,1300 81,5251 35,7852 30,3884 176,3277
-1 72,5920 28,8845 33,7294 178,1300 81,5389 35,7989 30,3949 176,3277
0 72,5898 28,8744 33,6888 178,1210 81,5420 35,8073 30,3820 176,3000
1 72,6047 28,8762 33,6417 178,1345 81,5549 35,7897 30,3956 176,2004
2 72,6324 28,8841 33,6485 178,1874 81,5262 35,7783 30,4123 176,2004
3 72,6523 28,8855 33,6597 178,2506 81,4933 35,7569 30,3922 176,1595
4 72,6544 28,8670 33,6754 178,2150 81,4720 35,7470 30,3734 176,1454
-2 72,5336 28,9271 32,2229 178,1233 81,5657 35,8260 30,3864 176,2811
-1 72,5721 28,8711 33,7235 178,1000 81,5261 35,7897 30,3937 176,2811
0 72,5744 28,8715 33,6704 178,1100 81,5458 35,7872 30,3792 176,2700
1 72,5964 28,8788 33,6453 178,1018 81,5450 35,7834 30,3992 176,1606
2 72,6245 28,8804 33,6419 178,1891 81,5146 35,7725 30,4069 176,1606
3 72,6392 28,8833 33,6542 178,2315 81,4861 35,7488 30,3979 176,1357
4 72,6548 28,8841 33,6637 178,2057 81,4602 35,7446 30,3689 176,1145
Positive Instant News Negative Instant News
Prices of buyer-initiated trades
Prices of seller-initiated trades
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